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FOREIGN INVESTORS IN U.S. MUTUAL FUNDS:                                       
THE TROUBLE WITH TREATIES 
Jeffrey M. Colon* 
The United States is generally a tax haven for foreign portfolio 
investors: the United States exempts from tax most U.S. source interest and 
capital gains, but taxes dividends from U.S. companies; tax treaties 
generally eliminate U.S. tax on interest and reduce the 30% statutory rate 
on dividends. 
Foreign investors in U.S. mutual funds have not been treated as 
favorably. Fund distributions (other than of net capital gains) were 
originally treated as taxable dividends, regardless of the fund’s underlying 
income. Interest or short-term capital gains earned by the mutual fund — 
which would have been tax exempt if directly earned by a foreign investor 
— were converted into taxable dividend income when distributed. 
To encourage foreign investment in U.S. mutual funds, Congress in 
2004 modified the mutual fund distribution rules to exempt from tax fund 
dividends that are attributable to the fund’s U.S. source interest income or 
short-term capital gains. The stated goal of the legislation was to tax foreign 
investors on the same basis as if they had directly earned their share of a 
fund’s income. 
These provisions fail to fully achieve this goal by denying pass-through 
treatment for foreign source interest and dividends. This policy appears to 
be aimed at preventing foreign investors from using a U.S. mutual fund to 
obtain U.S. treaty benefits. 
Foreign source income should retain its source and character when 
distributed to foreign shareholders. This tax treatment is consistent with the 
tax results a foreign investor realizes when he or she invests directly or 
through a partnership and encourages foreign investment in mutual funds 
that invest globally. The treaty shopping concerns may be illusory. To 
address potential treaty abuse, Congress could consider limiting the pass-
through of foreign source income to treaty residents. 
 
 *  Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank David 
Danone, Barnet Phillips IV, and participants of the Fordham Law School faculty workshop 
for their comments on prior drafts and April Colaku for her research assistance. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
U.S. mutual funds hold roughly 50% of the worldwide total net assets 
of all mutual funds.1 U.S. mutual funds provide many potential benefits to 
investors, including diversification, regulatory oversight, professional 
investment management,2 economic exposure to a wide variety of asset 
classes, daily liquidity for shareholders of open-end funds, simple 
procedures to reinvest income, and instant liquidity for shareholders of 
closed-end and exchange-traded funds (ETFs).3 Mutual funds offer small 
domestic investors access to foreign markets and issuers that would be 
practically impossible to accomplish through direct investment.4 The basic 
U.S. tax and regulatory regime governing mutual funds has been stable for 
seventy years,5 and U.S. mutual fund management fees are among the 
lowest in the world.6 
U.S. mutual fund shareholders have benefited from a relatively benign 
tax regime in Subchapter M.7 If a fund satisfies certain requirements 
regarding the composition and distribution of its income, the fund avoids 
 
 1 INV. CO. INST., 2014 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 219 tbl.60 (54th ed. 2014) 
[hereinafter FACTBOOK], https://www.ici.org/pdf/2014_factbook.pdf. In 2013, U.S. mutual 
funds held $15 trillion in assets, and the total worldwide assets of mutual funds were $30 
trillion. 
 2 Mutual funds can be divided into those funds that offer active management, in 
which fund managers trade securities based on their views of expected future price, and 
passive management, in which managers construct their portfolios to match a particular 
index, such as the S&P 500 index. 
 3 There are mutual funds that offer exposure to commodities, foreign stocks and 
bonds, and narrow sectors of the market. 
 4 To purchase foreign securities, an investor may have to open a foreign brokerage 
and bank account and deal with foreign currency and tax issues. 
 5 Mutual funds are subject to the provisions of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 
which is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1(b)(1)–(8) (2012). The tax rules governing mutual 
funds are in Part I, Regulated Investment Companies (sections 851 through 855), of 
Subchapter M of the Internal Revenue Code (Code). This article uses the terms “mutual 
fund,” “fund,” and “RIC” interchangeably. 
 6 Ajay Khorana, Henri Servaes, & Peter Tufano, Mutual Fund Fees Around the 
World, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 1279, 1287–88 tbl.2 (2009) (finding that funds sold in the United 
States had the lowest total expense ratio in a sample of eighteen countries). 
 7 See supra note 5. 
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entity-level taxation; instead, the fund’s shareholders are taxed on fund 
distributions. Moreover, unlike dividends paid by other U.S. corporations, 
dividends paid by a mutual fund partially reflect the tax character of the 
underlying fund income, such as net capital gain and tax-exempt interest. 
By characterizing certain portions of mutual fund dividends in accordance 
with the fund’s income, Subchapter M aims to impose roughly the same tax 
burden on fund shareholders had they directly earned their share of the 
fund’s income, i.e., modified pass-through treatment.8 
For foreign persons investing directly in U.S. stocks, bonds, and 
derivatives, the United States is a tax haven: most U.S. source interest 
income and capital gains of foreigners are exempt from tax regardless of 
amount. Dividends paid by U.S. corporations, royalties paid for the use of 
intangible property in the United States, and gains from the sale of U.S. real 
property interests are generally the only types of passive investment income 
taxed by the United States.9 
In contrast to the favorable U.S. tax regime for foreign direct 
investment, Subchapter M historically has been less hospitable to foreign 
investment. Before 2004, Subchapter M recharacterized only a fund’s net 
capital gains and tax-exempt interest when they were distributed.10 A fund 
distribution was otherwise treated as a U.S. source dividend even though it 
was economically attributable to the fund’s underlying foreign source 
interest, dividends, or short-term capital gains.11 Consequently, a foreign 
 
 8 See infra Part II.B. 
 9 U.S. source dividends and royalties are taxed at 30%. I.R.C. §§ 871(a)(1), 881(a)(1) 
(U.S. source dividends and royalties paid to foreigners are subject to a 30% tax). Treaties 
reduce the 30% rate on dividends to 15%, 5%, or 0% depending on the recipient’s ownership 
percentage of the payor corporation. I.R.S. PUB. 515, Withholding on Tax on Nonresident 
Aliens and Foreign Entities 51 tbls.1 (2016), https://www.irs.gov/PUP/individuals/ 
international/Tax_Treaty_Table_1.pdf. Source basis taxation of royalties is generally 
eliminated under treaties. Id.  Rental income from U.S. property is also potentially subject to 
flat 30% tax, but since rental property generally constitutes a U.S. trade or business, rental 
income is taxed at graduated rates (with allowance for deductions). Id. This article focuses 
solely on income traditionally earned by RICs such as capital gains, interest, and dividends, 
and will not further discuss the taxation of royalties and real estate income. 
 10 Certain mutual funds are able to pass through foreign tax credits. See I.R.C. § 
853(a)(1) discussed infra Part II.B. A dividend that is attributable to a fund’s qualified 
dividend income is treated as a qualified dividend, regardless of a particular investor’s 
holding period in the fund shares. See I.R.C. § 854(b)(1)(B). Notice 2004-39 sets forth rules 
for applying the differing tax rates in section 1(h) to the capital gains dividends paid by 
RICs. I.R.S. Notice 2004-39, 2004-1 C.B. 982. These rules are only relevant for U.S. 
taxpayers. 
 11 Since a RIC is a U.S. corporation, a dividend paid to a foreign investor would be 
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investor in a U.S. mutual fund often faced a significantly higher U.S. tax 
burden than if the investor had earned directly his or her share of the fund’s 
income. 
To encourage foreign investment in U.S. mutual funds, Congress 
amended in 2004 sections 871(k) and 881(e) of the Internal Revenue Code 
(Code) to exempt from tax mutual fund dividends paid to foreign investors 
if the dividends are attributable to a fund’s interest income and short-term 
capital gains.12  The stated goal of the legislation was to tax foreign mutual 
funds investors on the same basis as if they had directly earned their share 
of the fund’s underlying income.13 
The legislation, however, fails to fully implement this policy goal. In 
particular, only U.S. source interest is reclassified; foreign source interest 
and dividends are not reclassified, and when they are distributed to a 
foreign shareholder, they are a taxable U.S. source dividend.14  
Consequently, a foreign investor that owns a global money market, bond, or 
stock fund will be taxed on the fund’s foreign source income even though it 
would have been exempt from U.S. tax had the foreign investor directly 
earned the foreign source income. 
The legislative history does not discuss the rationale for excluding 
foreign source income. Earlier versions of the 2004 legislation provided for 
look-through treatment for foreign source interest that was exempt from 
foreign tax without regard to a treaty.15 The limitation on reclassifying 
foreign source income thus appears to be motivated by a concern that 
foreign investors could invest in a Regulated Investment Company (RIC) 
and indirectly obtain U.S. treaty benefits that the investors could not obtain 
directly.16 
 
taxed at 30%. I.R.C. §§ 871(a)(1), 881(a)(1) (U.S. source dividends paid to foreigners are 
subject to a 30% tax rate).  Capital gain dividends paid by a RIC were exempt from U.S. tax.  
See infra note 59. 
 12 American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 § 411(a)(1). 
 13 H.R. REP. NO. 108-548, pt. 1, at 164 (2004). 
 14 I.R.C. § 871(k)(1)(E) (defining qualified interest income to include only U.S. source 
interest). 
 15 See infra Part. III.D. 
 16 The extension of look-through treatment for foreign investors in U.S. mutual funds 
raises a policy question of whether such treatment should also be expanded for U.S. persons. 
Income, such as nonqualified dividends, interest, and short-term capital gains, is taxed at the 
same rates for U.S. taxpayers. The character of the income, however, can still matter because 
of its interaction with a U.S. taxpayer’s other income. The failure to pass through short-term 
capital gains does not fully implement Subchapter M’s policy goal of tax transparency and 
seems unnecessarily detrimental to U.S. taxpayers. 
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This article first briefly reviews the U.S. taxation of foreign portfolio 
investors and U.S. mutual funds and their U.S. shareholders, and it 
discusses why foreign investment in U.S. mutual funds had been 
historically tax inefficient. It then analyzes and critiques the 2004 
amendments and explores the complications that arise when applying 
treaties to RICs. It builds on and extends two important articles that 
examine the treatment of foreign investors in U.S. funds and the 
international tax issues of global investment funds.17 
This article argues that the treatment of a RIC’s foreign source income 
is inconsistent with the policy goals of the 2004 amendments and the 
general goal of neutrality of tax treatment of portfolio returns earned by 
investing directly or through a mutual fund, and it recommends extending 
look-through treatment to all foreign source income. This article 
demonstrates that the treaty shopping concern is mostly illusory, but it 
considers alternatives such as limiting look-through to foreign investors 
who are eligible for treaty benefits. This could be done on a unilateral, 
bilateral, or multilateral basis. 
II.  THE TAXATION OF U.S. MUTUAL FUNDS AND THEIR U.S. 
SHAREHOLDERS 
A.  Regulated Investment Companies 
The tax rules governing mutual funds and their shareholders are found 
in Subchapter M, the contours of which were largely established in the 
Revenue Act of 1942.18 To qualify as a RIC, an entity must be a domestic 
corporation (including a trust taxed as a corporation) and must be generally 
registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 as a management 
company or unit investment trust.19 
A RIC avoids corporate-level tax by satisfying certain distribution, 
gross income, and diversification tests. A RIC satisfies the distribution test 
by distributing 90% or more of its investment company taxable income 
 
17See Robert J. Staffaroni, Foreign Investors in RICs and REITs, 56 TAX LAW. 511 (2003); 
Kimberly S. Blanchard, Cross-Border Problems of Investment Funds, 60 TAX LAW. 583 
(2007). 
 18 See Jeffrey M. Colon, Oil and Water: Mixing Taxable and Tax-Exempt 
Shareholders in Mutual Funds, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 773, 778–788 (2014). 
 19 I.R.C. § 851(a)(1)(A)–(B). Certain common trust funds can also be taxed as RICs. 
I.R.C. § 851(a)(2). Common trust funds are funds maintained by a bank to collect and invest 
capital received in its capacity as a trustee, etc., in connection with fiduciary accounts such 
as trusts and estates. I.R.C. § 584(a). 
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(ICTI),20 which is regular corporate taxable income with certain 
adjustments, such as the exclusion for net capital gains (NCGs).21 A RIC 
avoids corporate-level tax on its NCGs if it distributes 90% or more of its 
NCGs.22 In calculating its ICTI and NCGs, a RIC deducts dividends of the 
ICTI and NCGs paid to its shareholders.23 The deduction for dividends paid 
is the mechanism by which RICs avoid corporate-level tax. 
To satisfy the gross income requirement, a RIC must derive at least 
90% of its gross income from investment-type income such as dividends, 
interest (both taxable and tax-exempt), income from securities lending, 
gains from the sale of stock and securities, gains realized from foreign 
currencies, and derivatives based on stocks or securities such as options, 
forwards, and futures.24 The underlying premise of the gross income 
requirement is that RICs should focus on earning investment income as 
opposed to operating income.25 
 
 20 I.R.C. § 852(a)(1)(A). The deduction for dividends paid must equal or exceed 90% 
of ICTI determined without regard to the deduction for dividends paid (excluding net capital 
gain dividends and exempt-interest dividends). Id. Although tax-exempt interest is not ICTI, 
a corporation must also distribute 90% of its tax-exempt income (less allocable expenses). 
I.R.C. §§ 852(a)(1)(B), 851(b). When distributed, tax-exempt interest retains its character if, 
at the close of each quarter, at least 50% of the RIC’s assets are tax-exempt obligations. 
I.R.C. § 852(b)(5). If a RIC is not eligible to pay a tax-exempt dividend, the interest will 
generate earnings and profits for the RIC and when distributed will constitute a taxable 
dividend. 
 21 I.R.C. § 852(b)(2)(A)–(C). 
 22 I.R.C. § 852(b)(2)(A). NCGs are the excess, if any, of net long-term capital gains 
(NLTCGs) over net short-term capital losses (NSTCLs). NLTCGs, in turn, are the excess, if 
any, of long-term capital gains over long-term capital losses, and NSTCLs are the excess, if 
any, over short-term capital losses over short-term capital gains. I.R.C. § 1222. Thus, long-
term losses and short-term losses in excess of short-term gains reduce NCGs. 
 23 I.R.C. § 852(b)(2)(D) (allowing for dividends, other than capital gains and exempt-
interest dividends, to be deductible in computing ICTI), (b)(3)(A) (subjecting RICs to a tax 
on the NCGs less capital gains dividends paid). 
 24 I.R.C. § 851(b)(2). Dividends also include Subpart F inclusions under section 
951(a)(1)(A)(i) and certain passive foreign investment company (PFIC) inclusions. I.R.C. § 
851(b) (flush language); Treas. Reg. § 1.851-2(b)(2) (as amended in 1978). Also included is 
income related to a RIC’s investment activities. I.R.C. § 851(b)(2)(A). To avoid failing the 
gross income test, a RIC can interpose a foreign corporation to hold the property that is 
generating the nonqualifying income. See Willard B. Taylor, “Blockers,” “Stoppers,” and 
the Entity Classification Rules, 64 TAX LAW. 1 (2010), for a discussion of the use of such 
entities. 
 25 See John Morley, Collective Branding and the Origins of Investment Management 
Regulation: 1936-1942, 6 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 341, 357 (2012) (finding that investing in 
ETFs helps alleviate the tax burden generated by the distribution requirement). See also 
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In keeping with Congress’s goal of RICs being passive investors, the 
diversification tests ensure that RICs will generally not own controlling 
interests in their portfolio companies. RICs are subject to two 
diversification tests, the 50% and 25% tests.26 The 50% test requires that at 
least 50% of a RIC’s total assets consist of cash, government securities, 
securities of other RICs, and securities of other companies.27  In making 
this calculation, however, a RIC can only count the securities of a single 
issuer in an amount up to 5% of the RIC’s assets, and it may not count more 
than 10% of the outstanding voting securities of the issuer.28 In addition, no 
more than 25% of a RIC’s total assets can be invested in a single issuer, the 
securities of certain publicly traded partnerships, or two or more issuers that 
the RIC controls and are determined to be engaged in the same or similar 
trades or businesses.29 
B.  U.S. RIC Shareholders 
A RIC that satisfies the distribution, income, and diversification tests is 
not subject to corporate-level tax to the extent it distributes its ICTI and 
NCGs. Instead, a RIC’s shareholders are taxed on the dividends received. A 
goal of the RIC tax regime is to tax shareholders similarly to how they 
would have been taxed had they directly earned their share of the RIC’s 
income. Consequently, distributions of NCGs, tax-exempt interest, and 
qualified dividends30 retain their tax character when distributed.31 
 
William A. Birdthistle, The Fortunes and Foibles of Exchange-Traded Funds: A Positive 
Market Response to the Problems of Mutual Funds, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 69, 90–91 (2008) 
(examining the tax advantages for mutual funds created by investing in ETFs). 
 26 I.R.C. § 851(b)(3) (both of these tests are determined quarterly). 
 27 I.R.C. § 851(b)(3)(A). 
 28 I.R.C. § 851(b)(3)(A)(ii). With respect to securities where market quotations are 
available, “value” means the market value; with respect to other securities and assets, 
“value” means a fair value as determined by the board of directors. I.R.C. § 851(c)(4). 
 29 I.R.C. § 851(b)(3)(B)(i)–(iii). Control is defined as “ownership in a corporation of 
20% or more of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote.” 
I.R.C. § 851(c)(2). A RIC is protected against failing the diversification tests solely because 
of subsequent changes in value of the securities in the portfolio. I.R.C. § 851(d)(1) (stating 
that a RIC will not fail a diversification test solely as a result of changes in the value of a 
portfolio from one quarter to the next, unless the diversification test is not satisfied 
immediately after the acquisition of any security and is partly or wholly the result of such 
acquisition). 
 30 I.R.C. § 1(h)(11)(B)(i)(I), (iii) (defining a qualified dividend as a dividend from a 
domestic corporation if the shareholder satisfies certain holding period requirements). I.R.C. 
§§ 1(h)(11)(D)(iii) (subjecting dividends issued by a RIC to the limitations set forth in 
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Not all distributed income, however, retains its tax character. In 
particular, short-term capital gains become ordinary dividends when 
distributed. This can be unfavorable to an individual taxpayer with capital 
losses because short-term gains can offset a shareholder’s capital losses 
without limit, whereas an individual can use only up to $3,000 of capital 
losses against ordinary income, such as dividends, interest, and wages.32 
Although the failure to pass-through the character of short-term capital 
gains is generally detrimental to an individual shareholder, the RIC regime 
is sometimes more beneficial than direct investment. In computing ICTI, a 
RIC deducts management expenses solely against ICTI and not against 
NCGs or qualified dividend income.33 This netting rule ensures that 
expenses are not netted against tax-favored income but against ordinary 
income. Moreover, if a shareholder directly held the fund’s securities, the 
deduction for investment expenses would probably be limited.34 
Certain RICs are eligible to pass through foreign income taxes paid. 
Under section 853(a), a RIC can elect to pass through foreign income taxes 
paid to its shareholders if more than 50% of the value of the RIC’s assets 
consists of stock or securities in foreign corporations.35 In such case, in 
computing its income, each RIC shareholder must include a proportionate 
share of the RIC’s foreign taxes paid as foreign source income, and in 
computing its foreign tax credit, it must treat the proportion of the dividend 
received attributable to the RIC’s foreign source income as foreign source 
income.36 
 
section 854), 854(b)(1)(B)(i)(III) (prescribing that a dividend received from a RIC whose 
qualified dividend income is less than 95% of its gross income is qualified dividend income 
to the extent designated by the RIC), 854(b)(4) (stating that the term “qualified dividend 
income” as used in section 854 has the same meaning as under section 1(h)(11)(B)). 
 31 A RIC shareholder can be taxed on a fund’s gains accruing before the investor 
became a shareholder. See Colon, supra note 18, at 817–28. 
 32 I.R.C. § 1211(b). 
 33 I.R.C. § 852(b)(2)(A) (excluding NCGs from ICTI); Rev. Rul. 2005-31, 2005-1 
C.B. 1084 (“A RIC’s investment company taxable income equals its taxable income 
(exclusive of net capital gain) reduced by allowable expenses and its deduction for dividends 
paid determined without regard to capital gains dividends and exempt-interest dividends.”). 
 34 If a taxpayer’s trading does not constitute a trade or business, investment expenses 
would be deductible only to the extent that they exceed 2% of a taxpayer’s adjusted gross 
income. I.R.C. §§ 67(a), 212. Pursuant to section 67(c)(2), the Treasury is prohibited from 
treating expenses of publicly offered RICs as being subject to the 2% floor of section 67. 
I.R.C. § 67(c)(2). 
 35 I.R.C. § 853(a). 
 36 I.R.C. § 853(b)(2)(A)–(B). The statute specially provides that the foreign source 
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Since a $1 tax credit reduces taxes by $1, it usually is more beneficial 
for a RIC to pass foreign taxes through to its shareholders than to deduct or 
credit them against its ICTI.37 It is likewise generally more beneficial for a 
U.S. taxpayer to elect the foreign tax credit under section 901 than to 
deduct the foreign taxes.38 
If a RIC does not make the section 853 election, either because it opts 
not to or because it does not hold the requisite percentage of foreign assets, 
the RIC may elect to credit the taxes pursuant to section 90139 or simply 
deduct them from ICTI under section 164.40  If a RIC deducts the foreign 
taxes, ICTI is decreased by the amount of the foreign taxes, and a RIC’s 
shareholder’s taxes are roughly reduced by the amount of the deduction 
times the shareholder’s marginal tax rate.41 
Since not all of a RIC’s income retains its character when distributed, 
the RIC regime can be described as a modified pass-through regime. The 
failure to pass through the character and source of all RIC income 
historically has made RICs a tax-inefficient vehicle for foreign investors. 
 
characterization is for the purpose of computing the foreign tax credit and therefore does not 
otherwise convert a RIC dividend into foreign source income. See I.R.C. § 853(b)(2)(B). To 
illustrate, assume that a RIC earns $10,000 of ICTI, $8,000 of foreign source income and 
$2,000 of U.S. source income, and pays $1,000 of foreign taxes. If the RIC makes a section 
853 election and distributes all of its ICTI, a shareholder will receive a dividend of $9,000 
(the ICTI less the foreign taxes), but will have to include $10,000 in income (the dividend 
plus the foreign taxes). If the shareholder elects the foreign tax credit under section 901, it 
can potentially reduce its U.S. taxes by $1,000. See I.R.C. § 901(a). The actual amount that 
can be credited will depend on the shareholder’s total U.S. and foreign source income and 
allocable deductions. See I.R.C. §§ 861(b), 904 and the regulations thereunder. See infra Part 
III.B (discussing the application of this rule to foreign investors). 
 37 The leading tax treatise on mutual funds states that eligible RICs typically make the 
section 853 election to pass through foreign income taxes paid to its shareholders. SUSAN A. 
JOHNSTON & JAMES R. BROWN, JR., TAXATION OF REGULATED INVESTMENT COMPANIES AND 
THEIR SHAREHOLDERS, ¶ 3.08[3][b][i] (2016). Using data for tax years 2003 and 2004, 
however, one researcher estimates that less than 25% of eligible funds make the section 853 
election. Janie Casello Bouges, When Mutual Funds Fail to Make Foreign Tax Elections: 
What Does the Investor Lose?, 25 J. TAX’N INV. 33 (2008). 
 38 A deduction could be more beneficial than a credit for a taxpayer who has expiring 
excess foreign tax credits. 
 39 I.R.C. § 901(a). 
 40 I.R.C. § 164(a)(3). 
 41 In limited circumstances, it can be beneficial for the RIC to retain up to 10% of its 
income and elect to credit foreign taxes against its tax liability. See JOHNSTON & BROWN, 
supra note 37, at ¶ 3.08[3][b][ii], for a discussion of when doing so can be beneficial. 
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III.  FOREIGN INVESTORS AND U.S. MUTUAL FUNDS 
A.  The U.S. Taxation of Foreign Portfolio Investors 
Foreign portfolio investors42 are taxed at a flat 30% rate on U.S. source 
income that is fixed, determinable, annual or periodic (FDAP), such as 
interest paid by U.S. obligors and dividends from U.S. companies.43 Most 
U.S. source interest, however, including interest on bank deposits and 
portfolio debt, is exempt from the 30% tax.44 In addition, foreign investors 
pay no U.S. tax on capital gains from the sale of debt instruments, most 
stocks, options, commodities, and derivatives.45 Dividends paid by a U.S. 
 
 42 This article focuses solely on foreign portfolio or passive investment. A passive 
investor is one who does not hold a sufficient interest in an entity to influence management’s 
business decisions or control the entity. Portfolio investment is generally defined to be direct 
or indirect ownership of less than 10% of an entity’s voting power. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-
OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], OECD BENCHMARK DEFINITION OF FOREIGN DIRECT 
INVESTMENT, at 17 (4th ed. 2008) (describing how direct investors, in contrast to portfolio 
investors, seek to establish a lasting interest in the enterprise and to influence management, 
which is evidenced by owning at least 10% of the voting power of the enterprise). A foreign 
person is a foreign corporation or a nonresident alien. See I.R.C. § 7701(a)(5) (defining a 
foreign corporation as a corporation not organized in the United States or under state law); 
I.R.C. § 7701(b) (defining a nonresident alien as an individual that is neither a citizen nor a 
resident of the United States). 
 43 I.R.C. § 871(a)(1) (placing a 30% tax on the U.S. source FDAP income of 
nonresident aliens); I.R.C. § 881(a) (placing a 30% tax on the U.S. source FDAP income of 
foreign corporations). 
 44 I.R.C. § 871(i)(1) (granting an exemption for interest on bank deposits); I.R.C. § 
871(h)(1) (granting an exemption for interest on portfolio debt). Portfolio interest is all U.S. 
source interest on registered obligations, but it excludes certain contingent interest and 
interest received by 10% shareholders. I.R.C. § 871(h)(4) (excluding certain contingent 
interest); I.R.C. § 871(h)(3) (excluding interest received by 10% shareholders). 
 45 Gains from the sale of U.S. real property and stock of a U.S. company that is a U.S. 
real property holding company are treated as effectively connected income and subject to 
tax, unless the company is publicly traded and the seller owns 5% or less. I.R.C. § 897(a)(1) 
(treating such gains as effectively connected income); I.R.C. § 897(c)(3) (exempting such 
gains when the company is publicly traded and the seller owns less than 5%). With the 
exception of gains from the sale of U.S. real estate, capital gains of foreign persons are 
neither FDAP income nor generally subject to U.S. tax. The heading to section 871(a)(1), 
which describes FDAP income, limits its application to “income other than capital gains.” 
See I.R.C. § 871(a)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.871-7(a)(1) (as amended in 1997) (stating that 
nonresident aliens are generally not taxable on “gains from the sale or exchange of 
property”); Treas. Reg. § 1.1441-2(b)(2)(i) (as amended in 2013) (excluding gains from the 
sale of property from FDAP income for withholding tax purposes). In addition, the sale of 
personal property, including stocks and bonds, by a foreign person is generally foreign 
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corporation and passive royalties received for the use of intangible property 
in the United States are the only passive investment income taxed by the 
United States. The foreign source investment income of foreign persons 
without a U.S. trade or business, such as interest paid by a foreign obligor 
or dividends from a foreign corporation, is naturally exempt from U.S. 
tax.46 
The United States has a long history of encouraging foreign investment 
in U.S. stocks, bonds, and commodities, even for large-scale investment 
activity. Trading in securities can sometimes constitute a trade or business 
if the taxpayer executes a sufficient number of trades throughout the year 
and attempts to profit from short-term price movements rather than price 
increases that reflect longer-term strategies.47 Since 1936, foreign investors 
have benefited from two statutory trading safe harbors, one for “trading” 
and the other for “trading for one’s own account.” A foreign investor 
trading its own funds will not have a U.S. trade or business even if it has a 
U.S. office and hires employees with or without discretionary authority to 
effect the transactions.48 Trading on behalf of others through a broker or 
other independent agent is also not a U.S. trade or business if the investor 
does not have an office or fixed place of business in the United States 
through which the transactions are effected.49 If a foreign investor’s trading 
 
source income and therefore exempt. See I.R.C. § 865(a)(2) (qualifying income from the sale 
of personal property by nonresidents, which includes nonresident aliens with a foreign tax 
home and foreign corporations, as foreign source income). U.S. source capital gains from the 
sale of intellectual property contingent on use in the United States are subject to U.S. tax 
under section 871(a)(1)(D) as are U.S. source capital gains of nonresident aliens present in 
the United States for 183 days or more. See I.R.C. § 871(a)(2). Derivative income is 
generally sourced by the residence of the recipient, except to the extent that a foreign person 
receives a dividend equivalent payment, i.e., a payment that is determined by reference to a 
U.S. source dividend. See I.R.C. § 871(m). 
 46 See I.R.C. § 872(a)(1) (including only U.S. source income in the gross income of a 
nonresident alien not engaged in a U.S. trade or business). 
 47 See, e.g., Estate of Yaeger v. Comm’r, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 1101 (1988), aff’d, 889 
F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1989); Ball & Northrop v. Comm’r, 80 T.C.M. (CCH) 184 (2000). If a 
foreign investor’s activities rise to the level of those of a trade or business, the United States 
taxes the effectively connected income at graduated rates with deductions for ordinary and 
necessary business expenses. I.R.C. § 871(b). 
 48 I.R.C. § 864(b)(2)(A)(ii), (B)(ii) (excluding from the term “trade or business” the 
trading of stocks, securities, and commodities for a non-dealer taxpayer’s own account).  See 
Erika W. Nijenhuis, The Section 864(b)(2) ‘Trading in Derivatives’ Safe Harbor, 39 TAX 
MGM’T. MEMORANDUM (BNA) 371 passim (Nov. 9, 1998), for a discussion of this 
provision. 
 49 I.R.C. § 864(b)(2)(A)(i), (B)(i), (C) (trading through U.S. broker or other 
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activity falls within these safe harbors, the activity will not constitute a U.S. 
trade or business regardless of the number of trades, the amount traded, or 
the gain recognized; the foreign investor’s capital gains will be exempt 
from U.S. tax; and the FDAP rules will apply to the investor’s U.S. source 
interest and dividends. 
The U.S. policy is to encourage foreign capital to flow unimpeded by 
source basis taxation. Underlying this policy is the belief that this capital 
increases market liquidity and helps to lower the cost of capital for all 
businesses, and that the lost revenue from source taxation is compensated 
by the increased income of U.S. intermediaries, such as brokers and 
advisers. 
The United States has entered into sixty-seven bilateral income tax 
treaties, which modify the application of domestic tax rules for treaty 
residents.50  The principal aim of tax treaties is to mitigate tax avoidance 
and double taxation, which is accomplished primarily by significantly 
reducing or eliminating source country taxation. Under most U.S. treaties, 
any residual tax on U.S. source interest is eliminated, the 30% tax on 
royalties is eliminated, and the 30% rate on dividends is reduced to a 
maximum rate of 15%.51 For shareholders owning more than 10% of the 
payor corporation, the treaty dividend rate generally drops to 5%, and in 
recent treaties, the dividend rate drops to 0% for distributions from 80%-
owned subsidiaries or to pension plans.52 
Given the favorable tax treatment accorded to foreign passive investors 
under the Code and tax treaties, the United States holds itself out as a tax 
haven for passive foreign investment capital. In 2011, foreigners received 
$568 billion of U.S. source income, of which $509 billion (90%) was 
exempt from tax.53 $444 billion (78% of all payments) was paid to treaty 
residents.54 Of the $59 billion subject to tax, only $8.9 billion of tax was 
 
independent agent does not create a trade or business provided that a taxpayer has no U.S. 
office or fixed place of business). 
 50 https://www.irs.gov/Businesses/International-Businesses/United-States-Income-
Tax-Treaties—-A-to—Z. 
 51 For a table summarizing the treaty rates applicable to U.S. source income received 
by treaty residents, see I.R.S. PUB. 515, Withholding on Tax on Nonresident Aliens and 
Foreign Entities 51 tbl.1 (2016), https://www.irs.gov/PUP/individuals/international 
/Tax_Treaty_Table_1.pdf. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Scott Luttrell, Foreign Recipients of U.S. Income, 2011, STAT. INCOME BULL. 8 tbl.1 
(Feb. 27, 2015), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/soi-a-init-id1501.pdf. 
 54 Id. 
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collected ($5.4 billion was collected from treaty investors).55 Foreign 
investors received $110 billion of U.S. source dividends, of which treaty 
residents received about 90%.56 These data demonstrate that treaty residents 
supply most of the foreign capital invested in the United States.57 
B.  The U.S. Taxation of Foreign Investors in RICs 
Although the United States has long been a tax haven for direct foreign 
portfolio investors, accessing U.S. capital markets indirectly through RICs 
has been historically tax inefficient for foreign investors. Gain realized by a 
foreign investor on the sale of shares of a U.S. mutual fund has been treated 
similarly to the gain from the sale of other capital assets and therefore 
exempt from U.S. tax.58 In addition, under long-standing administrative 
guidance, distributions of capital gain dividends by U.S. RICs have been 
treated as tax-exempt capital gains for foreign shareholders.59 The tax 
inefficiency specifically arose with respect to mutual fund distributions that 
were treated as ordinary dividends and therefore taxed at 30% (unless 
reduced by a treaty) even though the dividends were attributable to a fund’s 
short-term capital gains, interest income, foreign source dividends, or swap 
income. If a foreign investor had directly earned any of this income, it 
would have been exempt from U.S. tax.60 
 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. at 9 tbl.1. 
 57 One can assume that treaty residents also supply indirectly a portion of the capital 
invested by nontreaty residents, e.g., through investment in entities in the Cayman Islands. 
 58 In an open-end mutual fund, an investor may request that the fund redeem his or her 
shares at net asset value (NAV). Since 2010, a redemption of shares of a publicly traded RIC 
is treated as a sale or exchange and not a dividend regardless of the percent of the shares 
redeemed. See I.R.C. § 302(b)(5). 
 59 See Rev. Rul. 69-244, 1969-1 C.B. 215, obsoleted by T.D. 8734, 1997-2 C.B. 109 
(stating that capital gain dividends do not constitute fixed or determinable annual or 
periodical income under section 1441 and are not subject to withholding under sections 1441 
and 1442). In addition, a RIC (or intermediary such as a bank or brokerage house) can elect 
to reduce withholding on distributions representing capital gain dividends (and exempt 
interest dividends). Treas. Reg. § 1.1441-3(c)(2)(i)(D) (as amended in 2015). Special rules 
for RIC distributions are found in Treas. Reg. § 1.1441-3(c)(3)(i)–(ii) (as amended in 2015). 
 60 Prior to 1986, distributions from RICs that invested primarily in foreign securities 
could be treated as foreign source income and therefore exempt from U.S. tax. Rev. Rul. 69-
235, 1969-1 C.B. 190, held that dividends and capital gains dividends paid by a RIC to a 
nonresident alien were foreign source income if 80% or more of the RIC’s gross income was 
foreign source. The 80% rule was based on former section 861(a)(2)(A), which was effective 
for payments made before January 1 1986, and which provided that if less than 20% of a 
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To add further insult to injury, a foreign investor in a RIC that makes a 
section 853 foreign tax credit election may also be taxed on the foreign 
taxes paid by the RIC even though the investor does not actually receive the 
income.61 Section 853(b)(2)(A) provides that each shareholder of a RIC 
that makes a section 853 election must “include in gross income and treat as 
paid by him his proportionate share of such taxes.” For a U.S. shareholder, 
this provision places the shareholder in the same position had he or she 
directly earned the foreign source income and prevents a shareholder from 
obtaining the benefit of a deduction and credit.62 To ensure that a U.S. 
investor can credit the foreign taxes, section 853(b)(2)(B) treats as foreign 
source income the portion of the RIC dividend that represents both the 
grossed up foreign taxes and the associated foreign source income.63 
For a foreign investor, however, this provision is punitive. Since a 
foreign investor only receives as a dividend the cash the RIC receives after 
foreign taxes, a foreign investor is taxed on income it never receives.64 
 
U.S. corporation’s gross income was U.S. source, any dividend paid by the corporation was 
foreign source if less than 20% of the gross income for the three years preceding the 
distribution was U.S. source. Former I.R.C. § 861(a)(2)(A), amended by Pub. L. No. 99-514, 
§ 1214(b), 100 Stat. 2085, 2542 (1986) (codified as amended at I.R.C. §§ 861, 871), 
effective for payments after December 31, 1986. After the amendment, all dividends from 
U.S. corporations, except corporations that had a section 936 election in effect, were U.S. 
source. See I.R.C. § 861(a)(2). The same ruling held that if 20% or more of the RIC’s 
income was from U.S. sources, capital gains dividends would be U.S. source. This was 
primarily relevant for nonresident aliens who were subject to tax under section 871(a)(2); a 
nonresident not subject to section 871(a)(2) would not be taxed on capital gains regardless of 
their source. See I.R.C. § 871(a)(2). 
 61 See I.R.C. § 853(b)(2)(A). 
 62 Assume a RIC earns $100 of foreign dividends subject to a withholding tax of $15 
and distributes $85 to its U.S. shareholder. If a RIC were able to pass through the $15 of 
foreign taxes to the shareholder but the shareholder did not have to gross up the $85 received 
by the $15 of foreign taxes, the shareholder would get a double benefit for the $15—a $15 
deduction ($100 minus $15) coupled with a $15 credit against $85. Instead, a shareholder is 
treated as receiving a $100 dividend with a $15 credit, which is the same tax treatment as if 
the shareholder had earned directly the foreign source income. 
 63 Id. In the absence of this rule, the dividend would be treated as U.S. source in its 
entirety. When this provision was enacted, however, a dividend from a RIC that invested 
primarily in foreign assets could have been foreign source. See Rev. Rul. 69-235, supra note 
60. 
 64 Under the gross up rule in section 853(b)(2)(A), if a RIC receives a $100 dividend 
subject to a source base tax of $15, the RIC distributes $85, but a foreign shareholder has 
FDAP income of $100 on which the U.S. withholds 30%, unless a treaty applies. Prior to 
1986, dividends from a fund that invested primarily in foreign assets would have been 
foreign source and the resourcing rule would be superfluous except for those foreign funds 
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Since the resourcing rule of section 853(b)(2)(B) applies only for purposes 
of determining a taxpayer’s foreign tax credit, and since foreign portfolio 
investors are not eligible to credit foreign taxes against their FDAP liability, 
both the dividend received and the foreign tax gross up are U.S. source 
income.65 
To stimulate foreign investment in U.S. mutual funds, in 2004, 
Congress extended look-through treatment for a RIC’s U.S. source interest 
and short-term capital gains for foreign shareholders.66 The potential 
adverse effects for foreign shareholders of a RIC making a section 853 
election, however, were left untouched. 
C.  Expanding Look Through for Foreign Shareholders 
In the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004,67 Congress modified the 
treatment of RIC dividends paid to a foreign shareholder by providing for 
look-through treatment to the extent that the dividends were attributable to 
a fund’s interest income (“interest-related dividends” (IRDs)) or short-term 
capital gains (“short-term capital gain dividends” (STCGDs)).68 
The motivation for the change was twofold. First, Congress noted the 
disparate U.S. tax consequences to a foreign investor investing directly in a 
 
that could not satisfy the 80% rule of former section 861(a)(2)(A). See supra note 60. 
 65 I.R.C. § 906(b)(3) (denying nonresident aliens and foreign corporations the ability to 
credit foreign taxes against their FDAP tax liabilities). In addition, a foreign investor could 
not deduct the foreign taxes against his or her FDAP liability. See C.C.A. 2001-52-046 
(Nov. 21, 2001) (confirming that foreign tax gross up and RIC distribution is U.S. source 
income and that the resourcing rule applies only for foreign tax credit purposes for Puerto 
Rican residents). 
 66 American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 411(a)(1), 118 Stat. 
1418, 1500. 
 67 American Jobs Creation Act of 2004. Various versions of the legislation had been 
introduced in previous sessions of Congress. See, e.g., S. 1748, 102d Cong. (1st Sess. 1991); 
S. 1733, 103d Cong. (1st Sess. 1993); H.R. 2015, 104th Cong. (1st Sess. 1995); H.R. 2018, 
106th Cong. § 305 (1st Sess. 1999); H.R. 1669, 108th Cong. § 305 (1st Sess. 2003). 
 68 American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 § 411(a)(1); I.R.C. § 871(k)(1)(A) (exempting 
foreign individuals from the FDAP tax on IRDs); § 881(e)(1)(A) (providing the same 
exemption for foreign corporations); § 871(k)(2)(A) (exempting foreign individuals from the 
FDAP tax on STCGDs); § 881(e)(2) (providing the same exemption for foreign 
corporations). In addition, IRDs and STCGDs are exempt from withholding. I.R.C. §§ 
1441(c)(12) (stating that there is no withholding on IRDs and STCGDs paid to 
nonresidents), 1442(a) (stating the same for foreign corporations). A fund must inform its 
shareholders of the amount of an IRD or a STCGD. See I.R.C. § 871(k)(1)(C)(i) (applying to 
an IRD); § 871(k)(2)(C)(i) (applying to a STCGD). 
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fund’s underlying securities and indirectly through a fund.69 In addition, 
Congress was concerned that U.S. mutual funds were developing offshore 
parallel funds for foreigners to mitigate the tax inefficiencies of the U.S. 
RIC regime and wished to encourage U.S. financial institutions to bring 
such activities on-shore:70 
[T]he Committee believes that, to the extent a RIC distributes to a 
foreign person a dividend attributable to amounts that would have 
been exempt from U.S. withholding tax had the foreign person 
received it directly (such as portfolio interest and capital gains, 
including short-term capital gains), such dividend similarly should 
be exempt from the U.S. gross-basis withholding tax. 
A STCGD is limited to a RIC’s qualified short-term gain, which is the 
excess of net short-term gains over net long-term capital losses.71 By 
according look-through treatment to short-term capital gains, the statute 
converts what under pre-2004 law was ordinary U.S. source dividend 
income taxed at 30% (unless reduced by treaty) into tax-exempt capital 
gain. The exemption accorded to a RIC’s short-term capital gains is 
consistent with the treatment of portfolio capital gains realized directly by 
foreign investors.72 
The amount that a RIC can designate annually as an IRD is limited to 
the RIC’s qualified net interest income (QII), which is a RIC’s “qualified 
interest income” reduced by allocable deductions.73 QII is limited to certain 
categories of U.S. source interest income, including short-term original 
issue discount, interest on registered obligations, interest from certain bank 
deposits, and any IRD received from another RIC.74 
 
 69 H.R. REP. NO. 108-548, pt. 1, at 164 (2004). 
 70 Id. 
 71 I.R.C. § 871(k)(2)(D). Net short-term gain is the excess of short-term gains over 
short-term losses. I.R.C. § 1222(5). Net long-term capital loss is the excess of long-term 
capital losses over long-term capital gains. I.R.C. § 1222(8). Thus, long-term losses first 
reduce long-term gains and then any net short-term gains. 
 72 Capital gains are not considered to be FDAP income subject to 30% tax under 
section 871(a)(1)(A). I.R.C. § 871(a)(1)(A). In addition, capital gains realized from the 
disposition of personal property by a foreign person are generally foreign source income and 
are therefore not subject to a tax under sections 871 or 881. I.R.C. § 865(a)(2). 
 73 I.R.C. § 871(k)(1)(D). 
 74 I.R.C. § 871(k)(1)(E)(i) (applying to short-term original interest discount), (ii) 
(applying to interest on registered obligations), (iii) (applying to interest on bank deposits), 
(iv) (applying to IRDs received from other RICs). Some categories of U.S. source interest, 
500 Virginia Tax Review [Vol.  35:483 
 
Even if interest satisfies the QII income test at the RIC level, an IRD 
will be treated as a taxable U.S. source dividend if it is attributable to 
interest on debt issued by the foreign shareholder or any corporation or 
partnership with respect to which the foreign shareholder is a 10% 
shareholder.75 The second restriction is designed to prevent a foreign 
shareholder from using a RIC as a conduit for U.S. source interest that 
would otherwise not be exempt under the portfolio interest rules.76 
To compute its IRD, a RIC must reduce its qualified interest income by 
“properly” allocable expenses, guidance for which was provided in 
 
however, are excluded from the definition of QII, such as interest received from a 
corporation or partnership if the RIC is a 10% shareholder and interest that is contingent 
interest. I.R.C. § 871(k)(1)(E)(ii)(I) (excluding interest if RIC is a 10% shareholder), (II) 
(excluding contingent interest defined under section 871(h)(4)). The fact that a RIC owns 
10% or more of the debtor taints all of the interest paid even though the RIC shareholder’s 
proportionate share of the interest is significantly less. This approach is inconsistent with 
treatment of interest held by a partnership. See Treas. Reg. § 1.871-14(g)(3) (as amended in 
2015) (making the 10% shareholder determination at the partner level). These limitations 
track exceptions to the portfolio interest rules under which U.S. source interest paid to a 10% 
shareholder (and U.S. source contingent interest) do not qualify as tax-exempt portfolio 
interest, and they are designed to prevent a foreign RIC shareholder from obtaining a U.S. 
tax benefit that it could not obtain if it invested directly in the underlying assets. I.R.C. § 
871(h)(3)(A) (excluding from portfolio interest any interest received by 10%-or-more 
shareholder (determined by vote) and 10%-or-more partner (determined by capital or 
profits); I.R.C. § 871(h)(4) (excluding from contingent interest, which is interest determined 
by reference to receipts, cash flows, income, profits, or change in the value of property of the 
debtor or a related person, or dividend or distributions made by the debtor or a related person 
from portfolio interest). 
 75 I.R.C. § 871(k)(1)(B)(i). An interest-related dividend will be taxable unless the 
withholding agent receives a statement that the beneficial owner of the RIC stock is not a 
U.S. person. I.R.C. § 871(k)(1)(B)(ii). An IRD received by a controlled foreign corporation 
(CFC) is treated as an ordinary dividend to the extent the dividend is attributable to interest 
paid by a related person to the CFC. I.R.C. § 881(e)(1)(B)(ii). A person is related to a CFC if 
the person is a U.S. shareholder of the CFC, a related person to the U.S. shareholder, or a 
related person under section 267(b). See I.R.C. § 267(b). This rule tracks the portfolio 
interest limitation applicable to CFCs. See I.R.C. § 881(c)(3)(C). Note, exempted from this 
rule is any interest of the RIC attributable to short-term original issue discount and bank 
deposit interest. See id. This rule similarly applies to IRDs received by CFCs. I.R.C. § 
881(e)(1)(B)(i). Exactly how a RIC is to determine that its shareholder is a 10% shareholder 
in another corporation or partnership is unclear. 
 76 The reason for the first restriction is unclear. If a foreign shareholder — individual 
or corporate — issued debt, the interest paid on such debt would generally be foreign source 
income and therefore would not constitute qualified interest income in the first place. See 
I.R.C. § 861(a)(1) (determining the source of interest generally by the residence of the 
obligor). 
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Revenue Ruling 2005-31.77 Under the facts section of the ruling, a RIC 
earned $10,000 of dividends (all qualified dividends (QDI)); $10,000 of 
interest (all qualified interest); $5,000 of STCG; and $5,000 of net LTCG.78 
The RIC had $10,000 of general and administrative (G&A) expenses, and it 
distributed $20,000 (total income less G&A expenses) to its U.S. and 
foreign shareholders.79 
Because of the different tax regimes for foreign and U.S. taxpayers, the 
RIC must make separate determinations for each. For U.S. shareholders, the 
RIC must determine the portion of the dividend that is a NCG and QII, 
since these amounts are subject to special tax rates.80 For foreign 
shareholders, the fund must determine the portion that is an IRD, STCGD, 
and NCG, since these amounts are exempt from tax.81 
The ruling first concludes that neither NCG, STCG, nor QDI are 
reduced by expenses.82 Thus, for foreign shareholders, the RIC reports 
$5,000 of NCG and $5,000 as STCGD, and for U.S. shareholders, $5,000 
of NCG and $5,000 of QDI.83 
In determining the portion of the dividend that is an IRD, the RIC’s QII 
is reduced by the portion of the G&A expenses equal to the percentage of 
its ICTI (STCGs, interest, and dividends) that is qualified interest income. 
Since the RIC’s QII constitutes 40% of the RIC’s ICTI,84 40% of the G&A 
expenses ($4,000) are allocated to QII resulting in an IRD of $6,000. This 
 
 77 Rev. Rul. 2005-31, 2005-1 C.B. 1084. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Although both qualified dividends and net capital gains are taxed at the same rates 
for individuals, it is necessary to distinguish between them since the NCGs can be offset by 
a shareholder’s capital losses up to the amount of the NCGs plus $3,000. I.R.C. § 1211(b). In 
the absence of any NCGs, a shareholder can use only $3,000 of capital losses against his 
other income. Id. 
 81 See supra note 68; I.R.C. 852(a)(1)(A). 
 82 These conclusions derive respectively from the statutory mechanism for taxing a 
RIC’s NCG, see I.R.C. § 852(b)(3), the definition of QDI, see I.R.C. § 871(k)(1)(D), and a 
statement on the legislative history discussing STCGD (“In computing the amount of short-
term capital gain dividends for the year, no reduction is made for the amount of expenses of 
the RIC allocable to such net gains.”). H.R. REP. NO. 108-548, pt. 1, at 166 (2004) 
(emphasis added). 
 83 The distinction between ordinary dividend and qualified dividends is irrelevant for 
foreign shareholders, as a RIC’s dividend income is not recharacterized under section 
871(k). I.R.C. § 871(k). 
 84 Excluding NCG of $5,000, the RIC’s ICTI is $25,000. Qualified interest income is 
40% of ICTI ($10,000/$25,000). See I.R.C. § 871(k)(1)(E). 
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determination is relevant only for foreign shareholders; for U.S. 
shareholders, the G&A expenses effectively reduce a RIC’s interest income 
and short-term capital gain. Even though the sum of the amounts 
determined for IRD, STCGD, NCG, and QDI ($26,000) exceed the actual 
distributions, the ruling concludes that the RIC could apply different 
designations to the dividends depending on whether the shareholder was a 
foreign or a U.S. person, which ensures that U.S. and foreign shareholders 
will only report collectively $20,000 of total dividends. 
Prior to the issuance of the ruling, mutual funds faced a potential 
dilemma in determining the amount of QDI and QII. If investment expenses 
were only allocated against a RIC’s non-QDI income, QII could be reduced 
or vice versa.85 This determination could have created a conflict between 
U.S. and foreign shareholders. 
This ruling is generally favorable to U.S. shareholders because it 
allocates expenses away from favorably taxed income — NCG and QDI — 
and thereby reduces less favorably taxed income such as interest and non-
qualified dividends. The ruling is also favorable to foreign shareholders 
because it allocates expenses away from NCGs and STCGs to interest and 
dividends. Although expenses allocated to QII reduce income that is tax-
exempt in the hands of foreign shareholders, expenses allocated to 
dividends of the RIC reduce income that is taxable at 30%. For an equity 
RIC, the RIC’s dividend income is likely greater than interest income. 
D.  A Critique of the Statute 
Although the legislative history to the foreign RIC provisions states 
that a goal of the amendments is to tax foreign RIC shareholders on the 
same basis as if they had directly earned their share of the RIC’s income, 
the statute fails to accomplish this goal. None of a RIC’s foreign source 
income is recharcaterized. In particular, the definition of qualified interest 
income is limited to U.S. source interest income — the statute does not 
recharacterize foreign source dividends (including similar income such as 
Subpart F inclusions and passive foreign investment company inclusions), 
interest, swap income, or foreign currency gains. These items count toward 
the RIC income test, but constitute foreign source income in the hands of 
the RIC, or would be foreign source income if earned directly by a foreign 
 
 85 Letter from Keith Lawson, Senior Counsel, Inv. Company Inst., to Barbara Angus, 
Int’l Tax Counsel, Dep’t. of Treasury (Nov. 17, 2004) (on file with author); Steve Conlon, 
The Best of Both Worlds, CAP. CHANGES IN DEPTH 3–4 (May 31, 2005), http:// 
business.cch.com/capChanges/CCID_02-04_05.pdf. 
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investor.86 
Consequently, a distribution of a RIC’s foreign source interest, foreign 
source dividends, or swap income is taxed as an ordinary U.S. source 
dividend, even though had a foreign shareholder earned the income directly 
it would have been exempt from U.S. tax. The legislative history 
surprisingly does not shed any light on the rationale for these omissions. 
Before the enactment of sections 871(k) and 881(e), similar bills were 
introduced in prior legislative sessions as the Investment Competitiveness 
Act.87 Some of these earlier bills included under the definition of QII 
certain categories of foreign source interest: 
(ii) any interest derived by the regulated investment company from 
sources outside of the United States other than interest that is 
subject to tax imposed by a foreign jurisdiction if the amount of 
such tax is reduced (or eliminated) by a treaty with the United 
States.88 
Thus, in these earlier versions, foreign source interest (but not foreign 
source dividends) that was exempt from foreign taxes without regard to a 
treaty would have constituted QII. The apparent focus of this exception was 
interest paid on Eurobonds, which are bonds denominated in a currency 
different from the currency of the countries in which they are issued and 
sold.89 Like interest on portfolio debt, interest on Eurobonds is generally 
exempt from domestic tax.90 As discussed below,91 this provision suggests 
 
 86 Treas. Reg. § 1.863-7(b) (as amended in 2012) (sourcing notional principal contract 
income by the residence of the recipient); I.R.C. § 1293(a)(1) (requiring a shareholder of a 
qualified electing fund (QEF) PFIC to include in income as ordinary income its share of the 
PFIC’s ordinary earnings and as a LTCG its share of the QEF’s NCG); I.R.C. § 
1296(c)(1)(A), (2) (recognizing that the gain on mark-to-market (MTM) election of 
marketable PFIC stock is ordinary income and generally U.S. source income since MTM 
gain is sourced in the same manner as the sale of stock); I.R.C. § 951(a)(1) (requiring a U.S. 
shareholder of a CFC to include in income subpart F income and any section 956 inclusion); 
I.R.C. § 988(a)(3)(A) (stating that a foreign currency gain attributable to a section 988 
transaction is ordinary income sourced by the residence of the taxpayer). See Willard B. 
Taylor, Foreign Investment in Regulated Investment Companies, TAX MGM’T. INT’L J. (June 
13, 2008). 
 87 See supra note 67. 
 88 See, e.g., H.R. 1669, 108th Cong. § 2(a) (2003) (proposing new section 
871(k)(1)(E)(ii)). 
 89 CHRIS O’MALLEY, BONDS WITHOUT BORDERS: A HISTORY OF THE EUROBOND 
MARKET (2014). 
 90 John Glover, Eurobonds as Refugees from Tax Men Turn 50 in $4 Trillion Market, 
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that treaty shopping concerns may account for the failure to extend look-
through treatment to a RIC’s foreign source income. 
By excluding foreign source interest, foreign source dividends, and 
income that would be foreign source if realized directly by a foreign person 
from look-through treatment, the statute fails to achieve its stated policy 
goal of taxing foreign shareholders similarly to how they would have been 
taxed had they directly earned their share of the underlying RIC income. In 
addition, a foreign investor in a RIC making a section 853 election is 
further penalized by being taxed on income that it never receives.92 
Consequently, RICs holding foreign assets or earning foreign source 
income continue to be tax inefficient investment vehicles for foreign 
investors compared to either investing directly or through a true pass-
through entity such as a partnership.93 
E.  Investing Through Partnerships Compared to Investing Through RICs 
The foreign RIC amendments impose significant tax burdens on 
foreign shareholders to the extent a RIC earns income that is neither capital 
gains nor U.S. source interest. In particular, a RIC’s foreign source interest 
and dividends, and swap income are converted to taxable U.S. source 
dividends when distributed by a RIC to a foreign shareholder. A foreign 
investor’s U.S. tax burden is thus significantly different depending on 
whether the investor invests directly in such assets or indirectly through a 
RIC. 
Instead of comparing the U.S. tax consequences to a foreign investor 
that invests in a RIC with those arising from investing directly, one may 
more appropriately compare a foreign investor’s RIC tax burdens to those 
arising when investing in an investment partnership.94 An investment 
partnership replicates the investment options available to a RIC 
shareholder, such as professional investment management, back office 
 
BLOOMBERG (June 24, 2013, 9:44 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-06-
23/eurobonds-as-refugees-from-tax-men-turn-50-in-4-trillion-market (“The most important 
attribute of Eurobonds, by a mile, is that they’re free of withholding tax”). David Munves, 
The Eurobond Market, in THE HANDBOOK OF EUROPEAN FIXED INCOME SECURITIES 167 et 
passim (Frank J. Fabozzi & Moorad Choudhry eds., 1st ed. 2003). 
 91 See infra Part IV.D. 
 92 I.R.C. § 853(b)(2)(A). 
 93 Foreign assets constitute roughly 25% of the assets of U.S. equity RICs and 15% of 
U.S. bond funds. FACTBOOK, supra note 1, at 163 tbl.4. 
 94 The actual entity could be a U.S. or foreign partnership, a U.S. LLC, or a foreign 
entity that is treated as a partnership for U.S. tax purposes. 
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functions, and efficient executions of purchases and sales. 
Assume a foreign investor is a partner in a U.S. or foreign partnership95 
that earns the following income: capital gains from selling U.S. and foreign 
stocks; interest from bonds issued by U.S. and foreign issuers; and U.S. and 
foreign source dividends. In addition, assume that the partnership falls 
within the trading safe harbor and that there is no special allocation of the 
partnership’s income or expenses.96 A partnership is not taxed on income it 
earns; instead the partners are taxed on their distributive shares of the 
partnership’s income.97 Pursuant to statutory mandates reflecting the 
conduit nature of partnership taxation, the character of partnership income 
passes through to the partners.98 For example, the LTCGs of a partnership 
retain their character as LTCGs and must be separately reported, regardless 
of the partner’s holding period in his or her partnership interest.99 
For partnerships with foreign partners or foreign source income, it is 
generally necessary to determine and separately report the source of the 
partnership income so that the partners can determine their U.S. tax 
liability. Since foreign partners of an investment partnership are subject to 
U.S. tax only on their distributive share of the partnership’s income that 
constitutes U.S. source FDAP income, the partnership must separately 
 
 95 A domestic partnership is a partnership created or organized under the law of the 
United States or any state. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(4). A foreign partnership is a partnership that is 
not domestic. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(5). In the case of a general partnership, it may not be clear 
where it is formed since there are generally no state filing requirements. 
 96 If the partnership were engaged in a U.S. trade or business, the partners would also 
be engaged in a U.S. trade or business, and the partnership income would be subject to 
residence basis taxation in the hands of the partners. I.R.C. § 875(1) (stating that a foreign 
partner is engaged in U.S. trade or business if partnership is so engaged). Unger v. Comm’r., 
58 T.C. 1157 (1990), aff’d, 936 F.2d 1316 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (stating the same for 
partnerships with permanent establishment). 
 97 I.R.C. §§ 701, 702. 
 98 I.R.C. § 702(a) (requiring the partnership to separately state and the partners to 
account separately for, inter alia, STCGs and LTCGs, qualified dividends, and other items 
provided for in regulations); I.R.C. § 702(b) (stating that items of partnership income 
required to be separately stated have the same character as if “realized directly from the 
source from which realized by the partnership, or incurred in the same manner as incurred by 
the partnership”). The reference to “source” in section 702(b) should not be interpreted to 
refer to the source of income rules of sections 861 and 862, but instead to the character of 
the income, e.g., earned income or passive income. 
 99 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 68-79, 1968-1 C.B. 310 (stating that a partner should take into 
account his share of the partnership’s LTCGs even though the holding period of partnership 
interest was less than the long-term period). 
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report such income.100 For U.S. partners, the partnership must separately 
report the partnership’s foreign and U.S. source income and expenses so 
that the partners can determine their U.S. foreign tax credit.101 
The initial task is to determine whether the source of an item of income 
is determined at the partner or partnership level. The statutory mandate 
implementing the conduit or aggregate concept of partnership taxation in 
section 702 seems to require that the source of income should be 
determined at the partnership level and then taken into account separately 
by the partners.102 The source of interest and dividend income, which is 
determined by the residence of the payor, should be passed through to the 
partners.103 Consequently, a foreign partner would not be subject to any 
U.S. tax on its distributive share of the partnership’s U.S. source portfolio 
interest, foreign source interest, and dividends, but would be taxed on its 
share of U.S. dividends and U.S. source interest that did not qualify as 
portfolio interest. 
Application of the source rules is more difficult when the source of the 
income depends on the residence of the seller (as in the case of sales of 
personal property) or where certain activities related to the generation of the 
income occur (as in the case of income from personal services). The 
difficulty arises because of the different tax results if an entity or aggregate 
approach is adopted. In the case of sales, the partnership and individual 
partners could have different residences, and in the case of services, the 
individual partners could perform their services inside and outside of the 
United States.104 
Section 865(i)(5) provides that the source of income from the sale of 
personal property is determined at the partner rather than the partnership 
level.105 This rule ensures that a foreign partner will realize foreign source 
 
 100 Treas. Reg. § 1.702-1(a)(8)(ii) (as amended in 2005) (requiring that each partner 
take into account separately any partnership item that would affect the partner’s tax liability 
if it were not taken into account separately). 
 101 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(4)(viii) (2016). 
 102 See I.R.C. §§ 701, 702. 
 103 Craik v. United States, 31 F. Supp. 132, 135 (Ct. Cl. 1940) (holding that under the 
predecessor statute to section 871(b), the Revenue Act of 1918, a foreign partner of U.S. 
partnerships is not subject to U.S. tax on its distributive share of foreign source income of 
the U.S. partnership). See Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 2, §§ 213(c), 218(a), 40 Stat. 1066, 
1070. The source of certain guaranteed payments is not entirely clear. See Lewis R. 
Steinberg, Fun and Games with Guaranteed Payments, 57 TAX LAW. 533, 535 (2004). 
 104 See Gregory May, Wrongs and Remedies: The U.S. Tax Treatment of Multinational 
Partnerships of Individuals, 103 TAX NOTES 1509, 1510 (June 21, 2004). 
 105 I.R.C. § 865(i)(5). The statute grants the Treasury authority to change this result in 
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income from the partnership’s sale of personal property, such as stocks and 
bonds, and a U.S. partner will realize U.S. source income. For foreign 
partners, this rule is generally of little consequence because capital gains 
from selling personal property, whether U.S. or foreign source, are not 
FDAP.106 For U.S. partners, the main consequence of this rule is that it will 
affect the determination of a U.S. partner’s foreign tax credit.107 In addition, 
sourcing partnership income at the partner level may slightly increase the 
administrative burdens, since the partnership will have to segregate the 
source of such income depending on the tax residence of the partners who 
receive an allocation of the income. 
Just as the sale of RIC shares by a foreign investor is exempt from U.S. 
tax, a sale of an interest in an investment partnership should also be exempt. 
First, under section 865, the sale of personal property, including intangible 
property, of a foreign person is foreign source income.108 Second, under 
section 741, the sale of a partnership interest generates capital gain or loss, 
unless the partnership holds any assets, such as unrealized receivables or 
appreciated inventory, in which case a portion of the amount realized from 
the sale of a partnership interest is treated as ordinary income.109 Since an 
investment partnership generally does not hold receivables or inventory, 
section 751 should not apply to a sale of a partnership interest by a foreign 
 
regulations. Id. To date, no regulations have been issued. A U.S. citizen, resident alien, or 
nonresident alien with a U.S. tax home is a U.S. resident, as is a U.S. corporation. Citizens 
and resident aliens are not treated as having a foreign tax home (and being a foreign resident 
for purposes of section 865) unless a tax of 10% is actually paid to a foreign country. I.R.C. 
§ 865(g)(2). 
 106 I.R.C. § 871(a)(1). FDAP does not generally include gains from the sale or 
exchange of property. See id. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.1441-2(b)(2)(i) (as amended in 2013) 
(excluding gains from the sale of personal property from FDAP income for purposes of 
withholding). There is one situation in which the source of capital gains could matter for a 
foreign person. Under section 871(a)(2), a nonresident alien present in the United States for 
183 days or more during a taxable year is subject to a flat 30% tax on U.S. source capital 
gains for that taxable year.  I.R.C. § 871(a)(2). Since a foreign person who is resident in the 
United States for 183 days or more is generally a resident alien, see I.R.C. § 
7701(b)(1)(A)(ii), and thus is subject to residence basis taxation, this rule mainly applies 
only to persons whose days of presence do not count for determining U.S. tax residency, 
e.g., students and diplomats.  See I.R.C. § 7701(b)(5). In order for section 871(a)(2) to apply, 
these persons would also have to have a U.S. tax home or the gains would have to be foreign 
source. 
 107 U.S. source income does not increase a U.S. person’s foreign tax credit limitation 
under section 904. See I.R.C. § 904(a). 
 108 I.R.C. § 865(a)(2). 
 109 I.R.C. § 751(a). 
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investor.110 Finally, although the U.S. tax consequences to a foreign 
investor selling a U.S. or foreign investment partnership interest are 
identical, there are differences in the withholding requirements applicable 
to a foreign and U.S. partnership.111 
A foreign investor in an investment partnership is only taxed on the 
partnership’s U.S. source dividend income; foreign source income, capital 
gains, and U.S. interest that is portfolio interest are exempt from U.S. tax. 
Investing through a RIC that earns foreign source income is therefore 
generally more tax inefficient than investing directly or through an 
investment partnership because a foreign shareholder is taxed on the RIC’s 
foreign source income. Additionally, when investing directly or through a 
partnership, a foreign investor avoids U.S. tax on foreign taxes paid by the 
investor or the partnership, which may not be the case when investing in a 
RIC.112 
 
 110 For U.S. investors, section 751 can apply since, under section 751(c), unrealized 
receivable includes interest in certain foreign corporations described in section 1248.  I.R.C. 
§ 751(c)(2). In a controversial ruling, the Service adopted a look-through or aggregate 
approach for the sale of a partnership interest by a foreign partner and held that a foreign 
partner’s gain from the sale of a partnership engaged in a U.S. trade or business was 
effectively connected income (ECI) to the extent that the gain was attributable to the ECI 
property of the partnership. Rev. Rul. 91-32, 1991-1 C.B. 107. Gain attributable to the non-
ECI property was exempt foreign source income. Id. For a discussion of the revenue ruling, 
see N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N TAX SECTION, REPORT ON GUIDANCE IMPLEMENTING REVENUE 
RULING 91-32 (2014). The sale of an investment partnership not engaged in a U.S. trade or 
business would not be ECI regardless of whether an aggregate or an entity approach were 
adopted. 
 111 U.S. source FDAP income paid to a U.S. partnership is not subject to withholding. 
Treas. Reg. § 1.1441-5(b)(1) (as amended in 2014) (no withholding required on U.S. source 
FDAP paid to U.S. partnerships). Instead, the U.S. partnership must withhold when such 
amounts are distributed to a foreign partner or included in the foreign partner’s distributive 
share of partnership income. Treas. Reg. § 1.1441-5(b)(2) (as amended in 2014) (requiring a 
withholding on distributions consisting of U.S. source FDAP paid to a foreign person or 
when included in a foreign person’s distributive share on the earlier of (1) the date the K-1 is 
mailed, or (2) the fifteenth day of the third month after the end of the partnership’s taxable 
year).  In the case of a foreign partnership that is a nonwithholding foreign partnership, 
payments of U.S. source FDAP income to the partnership are treated as if made to the 
individual partners, and the payor will withhold based on the tax status of the individual 
partners. Treas. Reg. § 1.1441-5T(c)(1)(i) (2014). If the tax status of the individual partners 
cannot be determined, it is presumed that they are foreign and the payee must withhold at 
30%. Treas. Reg. § 1.1441-5T(d)(3) (2014). If the foreign partnership is a withholding 
foreign partnership, the partnership and not the payor will withhold based on the tax status of 
the partners. Treas. Reg. § 1.1441-5T(c)(2)(i) (2014). 
 112 See supra Part III.B. 
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A RIC offers one potential advantage for foreign investors through the 
treatment of investment expenses. In a RIC, investment expenses reduce 
ICTI. If a RIC earns only U.S. source dividend income, for example, such 
income is reduced by investment expenses, and a foreign investor is taxed 
on the (net) distributed amount. In essence, a foreign investor receives a 
deduction against U.S. source FDAP income, which would not be possible 
if it received the income directly.113 In the case of an investment 
partnership, if the investment expenses are charged as a percentage of assets 
under management (e.g., 1%), these fees would probably have to be 
separately stated for foreign partners and would therefore not reduce U.S. 
tax on U.S. source FDAP income.114 
The foreign mutual fund provisions fail to implement fully their 
purported goal of imposing the same U.S. tax burdens on foreign investors 
whether they invest directly or through a U.S. RIC, especially to the extent 
the RIC earns foreign source income. The infirmities of the statute are even 
more apparent when comparing the U.S. tax burdens of foreign investors in 
a RIC with those of an investment partnership that earns the same income 
as the RIC. The lack of discussion in the legislative history for excluding 
foreign source income from look-through treatment is especially surprising. 
Prior to the enactment of the foreign mutual fund provisions, similar 
bills had been introduced in Congress, and these bills provided that foreign 
source interest income that was exempt from foreign tax without regard to 
any U.S. treaty provision would be treated as qualified interest income.115 
 
 113 In computing ICTI, a RIC is not allowed to deduct net operating losses. I.R.C. § 
852(b)(2)(B). Consequently, the excess of investment expenses over investment income does 
not provide a current or deferred tax benefit to RIC shareholders. Since such expenses 
reduce a RIC’s net asset value (NAV), however, a RIC shareholder who sells its shares will 
realize a tax benefit because its amount realized will decrease. 
 114 For an overview of typical hedge fund compensation, see DONALD J. MARPLES, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22689, TAXATION OF HEDGE FUND AND PRIVATE EQUITY 
MANAGERS (2007).  A common practice for fund managers is to waive the management fee 
in exchange for an increased share of fund profits and thereby convert ordinary income into 
LTCGs.  See Gregg D. Polsky, Private Equity Management Fee Conversions, 122 TAX 
NOTES 743 (Feb. 9, 2009). The IRS issued proposed regulations in 2015 aimed at requiring 
income from many types of fee waivers to be treated as disguised payments for services 
under section 707(a)(2)(A). REG-115452-14, 80 Fed. Reg. 43,652 (July 23, 2015). A fee 
waiver that is treated as additional distributable share of partnership income to the fund 
manager in a fund that generates FDAP income would benefit a foreign investor because a 
nondeductible expense (the 1% fee) would be converted, via a reduction in the investor’s 
share of FDAP income, into a deduction. 
 115 See supra note 67. 
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This provision, which was omitted in the final legislation, suggests the 
policy rationale for excluding foreign source income from look-through 
treatment may have been to prevent third-country foreign investors from 
obtaining U.S. treaty benefits with respect to foreign source income by 
investing in a U.S. RIC.116 The tax treaty issues raised by cross-border 
investment by RICs with U.S. and foreign investors are addressed next. 
IV.  RICS AND TREATIES 
This section examines the treatment of mutual funds under tax treaties. 
It focuses first on the current treatment of RICs under treaties and the recent 
OECD efforts to accommodate mutual funds in tax treaties. It then 
discusses how the exclusion for pass-through treatment of foreign source 
income was primarily intended to prevent third-country foreign investors in 
U.S. RICs from availing themselves of U.S. treaty benefits and how this 
concern is exaggerated. 
One of the primary goals of tax treaties is to eliminate (or mitigate) 
double taxation, or the taxation of an item of income by both the source and 
residence countries.117 Treaties use various mechanisms to accomplish this 
goal. For investment income, the relevant provisions reduce or eliminate 
source basis taxation of interest, dividends, royalties, and capital gains.118 
By reducing source basis taxation, the residence country’s tax receipts are 
generally increased since the residence country’s credit for source basis 
 
 116 See Staffaroni, supra note 17, at 533. 
 117 Tax treaties are officially captioned as conventions for the avoidance of double 
taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and on capital 
gains. See also ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], MODEL TAX CONVENTION 
ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL: CONDENSED VERSION, para. 2 (2014) [hereinafter OECD Model 
Treaty] (noting that the main purpose of the OECD Model Treaty is to “clarify, standardize, 
and confirm the fiscal situation of taxpayers . . . through the application by all countries of 
common solutions to identical cases of double taxation.”). 
 118 See, e.g., Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of 
Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital Gains, U.S.-U.K., art. 2, 
para. 1, July 24, 2001, T.I.A.S. No. 13,161 [hereinafter U.S.-U.K. Treaty] (prohibiting the 
source country from taxing interest); id. art. 13, para. 5 (prohibiting the source country from 
taxing gains other than gains from real property); id. art. 12 (prohibiting the source country 
from taxing royalties); id. art. 10 (limiting the source country’s taxation of dividends to a 
maximum rate of 15%, 5%, or 0% depending on recipient’s ownership percentage). In 
addition, under the “Other Income” article, investment income that does not fall under one of 
the previous categories, such as swap income, is only taxable in the state of residence. Id. 
art. 22, para. 1 (prohibiting the source country from taxing “other income”). 
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taxation will decrease.119 
Pass-through or conduit entities present multiple treaty policy 
challenges. An assumption underlying treaty provisions is that when a 
source country reduces source basis taxation on an item of income, the 
residence country will tax that item. For conduits, this is not necessarily the 
case. If income arising in the source country is not taxed by the residence 
country either because the resident country recipient is tax-exempt or not 
subject to tax because it is a pass-through entity, the source country may 
argue that it does not have to relieve source basis taxation under a treaty 
because there is no possibility of double taxation.120 Since the income of a 
pure pass-through entity is taxed at the owner level and not at the entity 
level, should the residence of the entity that earned the income or the 
residence of the entity’s owner determine treaty benefits? 
A sine qua non of being a resident eligible for treaty benefits is being 
liable to tax.121 Since a RIC avoids entity-level tax to the extent it 
distributes its income and capital gains, it could be argued that a RIC is not 
subject to tax and therefore should not be eligible for treaty benefits. If a 
RIC is eligible for treaty benefits, but can pass the source and character of 
all of its income through to its shareholders, there is a concern that foreign 
investors that are residents of a country without a treaty with the source 
country could invest in a U.S. RIC and indirectly garner treaty benefits that 
they could not otherwise obtain had they invested directly in the RIC’s 
underlying securities. 
Both the United States and the OECD focused on the similar issue of 
the treaty treatment of partnerships and partners during the 1990s122 and 
 
 119 This is also true in the case of a country that does not permit a resident to credit 
source basis taxes because after-tax cash is increased. 
 120 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], COMMENTARIES ON THE ARTICLES 
OF THE MODEL TAX CONVENTION, para. 5, MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON 
CAPITAL (2010) [hereinafter OECD Commentary] (“Where, however, a partnership is treated 
as fiscally transparent in a State, the partnership is not ‘liable to tax’ in that State . . . and so 
cannot be a resident . . . .”); U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, UNITED STATES MODEL 
TECHNICAL EXPLANATION ACCOMPANYING THE UNITED STATES MODEL INCOME TAX 
CONVENTION OF NOVEMBER 15, 2006, at 9 (2006) [hereinafter U.S. Technical Explanation] 
(“entities that are fiscally transparent in the country in which their owners are resident are 
not considered to be resident of a Contracting State (although income derived by such 
entities may be taxed as the income of a resident, if taxed in the hands of resident partners or 
other owners).”). 
 121 U.S. Technical Explanation, supra note 120, at 13. 
 122 See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL 
TAXATION, NO. 6 THE APPLICATION OF THE OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION TO 
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amended their respective model treaties to address issues arising from the 
receipt of income by fiscally transparent (pass-through) entities.123 
Additionally, in 1997, the United States enacted section 894(c), which 
denies a foreign person treaty benefits for income derived through a 
partnership if (1) the income is not treated as income of the foreign person 
under foreign law, (2) the treaty does not specifically address pass-through 
entities, and (3) the foreign country does not tax a distribution of such 
income from the entity to the person.124 As a result of these changes, a 
partnership is not generally eligible for treaty benefits; instead, a partner is 
potentially eligible for treaty benefits to the extent that partner is taxed on 
his or her share of the partnership’s income, as determined under the laws 
of the partner’s country of residence.125 Thus, each foreign partner must 
demonstrate his or her entitlement to treaty benefits. 
The United States has pursued a different policy for RICs. U.S. treaty 
policy over the last twenty years has been to treat U.S. RICs as treaty 
residents. Not all countries, however, have adopted the same policy. In 
response to the significant increase in assets invested globally by 
investment companies — denominated in treaty argot as collective 
investment vehicles (CIVs)126 — the OECD published in 2009 detailed 
studies of the treaty issues raised by cross-border investments by CIVs.127 
 
PARTNERSHIPS (1999). 
 123 See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, UNITED STATES MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION 
OF NOVEMBER 15, 2006 art. 1, para. 6 (2006) [hereinafter U.S. Model Treaty], https:// www. 
treasury.gov/ press-center/ press-releases/ Documents/ hp16801. pdf; OECD Commentary, 
supra note 120 (the partnership amendments are primarily found in paras. 2–6.7). 
 124 Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 1054(a), 111 Stat. 788, 943; 
I.R.C. § 894(c). 
 125 See, e.g., U.S. Model Treaty, supra note 123, art. 1, para. 6. 
 126 The OECD limits CIVs “to funds that are widely-held, hold a diversified portfolio of 
securities and are subject to investor-protection regulation in the country in which they are 
established.” Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. [OECD], The Granting of Treaty Benefits 
with Respect to the Income of Collective Investment Vehicles,  para. 4 (May 31, 2010) 
[hereinafter OECD, Treaty Benefits CIVs], https://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/45359261.pdf.  
Under this definition, hedge funds and venture capital funds would not be CIVs. 
 127 Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. [OECD], Rep. of the Informal Consultative 
Group on the Taxation of Collective Investment Vehicles & Procedures for Tax Relief for 
Cross-Border Investors on the Granting of Treaty Benefits with Respect to the Income of 
Collective Investment Vehicles (Jan. 12, 2009), https:// www.oecd.org/ tax/ treaties/ 
41974553.pdf; Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. [OECD], Rep. of the Informal 
Consultative Group on the Taxation of Collective Investment Vehicles & Procedures for Tax 
Relief for Cross-Border Investors on Possible Improvements to Procedures for Tax Relief 
for Cross-Border Investors (Jan. 12, 2009) [hereinafter OECD, Possible Improvements], 
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The final 2010 report proposed changes to the Commentary on Article 1 of 
the OECD Model that were subsequently adopted.128 
The OECD recently revisited the treaty treatment of CIVs as part of its 
comprehensive program to develop international tax measures to combat 
the shifting of profits by multinationals to low or no-tax locations.129 CIVs 
are addressed in the measures focusing on treaty shopping.130 The OECD 
provided various possible provisions covering CIVs in its proposed 
limitations on benefits article.131 The proposals largely follow the 
recommendations and conclusions in the 2010 CIV report, and it appears 
the BEPS project will not recommend any additional modifications.132 
CIVs present distinct challenges for tax administrators to design rules 
that neither impede cross-border investments by imposing multiples levels 
of taxation on investment income nor encourage tax avoidance through 
abusive treaty shopping. First, in some countries, CIVs are separate 
corporate entities such as RICs, whereas in others, CIVs are trusts, and in 
 
https://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/41974569.pdf; Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. 
[OECD], The Granting of Treaty Benefits with Respect to the Income of Collective 
Investment Vehicles,  Public Discussion Draft  (Dec. 9,  2009),  https://www.oecd.org/fr/ctp/ 
conventions/44211901.pdf; OECD, Treaty Benefits CIVs, supra note 126. 
 128 Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. [OECD], The 2010 Update to the Model Tax 
Convention, at 4–12 (July 22, 2010) [hereinafter OECD, Model Commentary], 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/45689328.pdf (adding new paragraphs 6.8 to 6.34 to the 
Commentary on Article 1). The subject of the taxation of cross border investment funds has 
long been the focus of international practitioners and the OECD. See Patricia A. Brown, 
Fifty Years of Tax Uncertainty: The Problem of International Neutrality for Collective 
Investment Vehicles, in THE TAX TREATMENT OF COLLECTIVE INVESTMENT VEHICLES AND 
REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS 19, 19–22 (Hein Vermeulen ed., 2013). 
 129 The OECD base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) program is presented in ORG. 
FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT 
SHIFTING (2013) [hereinafter BEPS Action Plan]. 
 130 Id. 
 131 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], PREVENTING THE GRANTING OF 
TREATY BENEFITS IN INAPPROPRIATE CIRCUMSTANCES, at 41–46 (2014) (discussing the CIV 
provisions in the proposed limitation-on-benefits (LOB) article).  This draft was further 
revised in Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. [OECD], Revised Discussion Draft, BEPS 
Action 6: Prevent Treaty Abuse, at 7–8 (May 22, 2015), http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties 
/revised-discussion-draft-beps-action-6-prevent-treaty-abuse.pdf. 
 132 Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. [OECD], Revised Discussion Draft, BEPS 
Action 6: Prevent Treaty Abuse, at 8 (May 22, 2015), http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties 
/revised-discussion-draft-beps-action-6-prevent-treaty-abuse.pdf.  The OECD proposals to 
limit treaty shopping by CIVs are discussed infra Part IV.E. 
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others they are joint ownership vehicles.133 Some countries tax the CIV 
itself whereas in others, the CIV owners are taxed on their share of the 
CIV’s income whether or not it is distributed. Tax transparency — a single 
level of tax on the CIV’s income — is achieved in various ways, such as 
outright exemption of the CIV’s income or de facto exemption through 
deductions for distributions as in the case of RICs.134 While many issues of 
international taxation involve two countries — the source country (where 
the income arises) and the residence country (where the owner of the 
income is resident) — CIVs may involve three or more countries: the 
source country, the country where the CIV is formed, and the country 
where the CIV owner is resident.135 Finally, for CIV income that is subject 
to source basis taxation, various mechanisms could be used to relieve 
double taxation, but many raise significant administrative burdens for 
funds, their investors, and tax administrators. 
Given the disparate national approaches to taxing CIVs and their 
owners, the OECD did not proffer a definitive solution for the treatment of 
CIVs under treaties. The CIV amendments to the Commentary on Article 1 
of the Model Treaty establish a consensus position for many important 
treaty issues, lay the groundwork for resolving other issues, and will, at the 
least, be an important impetus to treaty negotiators to explicitly consider 
and address in negotiating new treaties or modifying existing treaties. They 
are also generally consistent with U.S. RIC treaty policy. 
A.  Are RICs Residents Under Treaties? 
Treaties provide benefits only to “persons” that are “residents” of the 
signatory countries to a treaty.136 A person includes a “company,” and a 
company is “any entity that is treated as a body corporate for tax purposes 
according to the laws of the state in which it is organized.”137 Since a RIC 
must be a U.S. corporation, it would certainly be considered a person for 
U.S. treaty purposes.138 This policy is consistent with the CIV Benefits 
 
133OECD, Treaty Benefits CIVs, supra note 126, paras. 21–23. 
 134 See Brown, supra note 128, at 26 (summarizing five models for fund taxation). 
 135 If the CIV is acquired through an intermediary, such as a bank or securities firm, 
there could be four or more countries involved. 
 136 See, e.g., U.S. Model Treaty, supra note 123, art. 1, para. 1 (“This Convention shall 
apply only to persons who are residents of one or both of the Contracting States, except as 
otherwise provided in the Convention.”). 
 137 Id. art. 3, para. 1(b). 
 138 See I.R.C. § 851(a) (“[T]he term ‘[RIC]’ means any domestic corporation . . . .”). 
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Report, which concludes that a CIV should qualify as a person for treaty 
purposes if it is treated as a body corporate for tax purposes but not if it is 
merely a form of joint ownership.139 
A resident is a person who is “liable to tax” by reason of, inter alia, its 
place of incorporation. The tax policy of the United States for the last 
twenty years has been to treat RICs not as fiscally transparent like 
partnerships but instead as corporate entities liable to tax, even though 
almost virtually all RICs distribute annually all of their ICTI and NCGs and 
thus pay no U.S. tax.140 The rationale for this policy is that RICs will be 
liable to tax if they do not satisfy certain distribution, organization, and 
investment requirements.141 All recent U.S. treaties ensure that U.S. RICs 
are treaty residents.142 
 
 139 OECD, Treaty Benefits CIVs, supra note 126, para. 25. The treatment of trusts is 
unclear. In common law countries, trusts are generally recognized as persons and entitled to 
treaty benefits. See, e.g., U.S. Model Treaty, supra note 123, art. 1, para. 1(a) (“‘person’ 
includes . . . a trust . . . .”). In the United States, trusts are subject to tax but may deduct 
certain amounts distributed to beneficiaries. See I.R.C. § 641 (subjecting a trust to tax on its 
taxable income under section 1(e)). Some civil law countries, however, do not recognize 
trusts. See Anna Nemenova, Tax Treatment of Trusts in Civil Law Countries and Application 
of Double Tax Treaties to Trusts (Part I), 43 TAX PLAN. INT’L REV. 20, 21 (Mar. 2016). 
 140 See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, UNITED STATES MODEL TECHNICAL EXPLANATION 
ACCOMPANYING THE UNITED STATES MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION OF SEPTEMBER 20, 
1996, at 13 (1996) (“[RICs and real estate investment trusts (REITS)] that are nominally 
subject to tax but that in practice are rarely required to pay tax also would generally be 
treated as residents and therefore accorded treaty benefits.”). 
 141 U.S. Technical Explanation, supra note 120, at 13 (“Although the income earned by 
[RICs] normally is not subject to U.S. tax in the hands of the entity, they are taxable to the 
extent that they do not currently distribute their profits, and therefore may be regarded as 
‘liable to tax.’ They also must satisfy a number of requirements under the Code in order to 
be entitled to special tax treatment.”). See also Rev. Rul. 2000-59, 2000-2 C.B. 593 
(concluding that investment entity subject to RIC-like tax regime was liable to tax under 
treaties identical to 1996 Model Treaty but noting that the entity’s distributions to foreign 
interest holders were subject to tax regardless of the source of the entity’s underlying 
income). 
The regulations under section 894 treat an entity as fiscally transparent if under the laws of 
the entity’s jurisdiction an interest holder must take into account on a current basis its share 
of the entity’s income, whether or not distributed to the interest holder, and the character 
and source of the item of income are determined as if such item were realized directly from 
the source which realized by the entity. Treas. Reg. § 1.894-1(d)(3)(ii) (as amended in 2013) 
(emphasis added). A RIC thus would not be treated as fiscally transparent. 
 142 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE 
CONVENTION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND 
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND FOR THE 
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The “liable to tax” criterion was especially challenging for the OECD 
because of the disparate domestic approaches to taxing CIVs and their 
owners. Domestic legislation generally aims to impose similar tax burdens 
on the income of CIV investors whether it is earned directly or indirectly. 
As the CIV Benefits Report states: “Thus, the intent is to ensure neutrality 
between direct investments and investments through a CIV, at least when 
the investors, the CIV and the investment are all located in the same 
country.”143 
One aspect of neutrality is that a CIV’s income be subject to only one 
level of tax, which is achieved by various methods. Some countries treat 
CIVs as fiscally transparent, like U.S. partnerships, whereas others 
nominally tax a CIV’s income but permit a deduction for distributions to 
the CIV owners, as is the case of RICs. Some countries tax a CIV’s income 
at a low rate or provide for exemption of the CIV’s income in the investors’ 
hands or permit imputation of the CIV taxes paid at the owner level.144 
The CIV Benefits Report concludes that a CIV will be a resident 
provided that it is potentially liable to tax even if a CIV does not actually 
pay tax, because, for instance, the CIV can deduct distributions in 
determining its taxable income.145 If, however, a CIV is actually exempt 
from tax or fiscally transparent, it will not qualify as a resident. This 
approach is consistent with U.S. tax policy. Not all countries, however, 
agree that CIVs satisfy the liable-to-tax criterion since CIVs are specifically 
structured so that they do not pay tax and very few actually pay tax.146 
 
AVOIDANCE OF DOUBLE TAXATION AND THE PREVENTION OF FISCAL EVASION WITH RESPECT 
TO TAXES ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL GAINS 16 (2013) [hereinafter “U.S.-U.K. Technical 
Explanation”]. 
 143 OECD, Treaty Benefits CIVs, supra note 126, para. 27. 
 144 Id. para. 28. 
 145 Id. paras. 29–30 (treating a CIV as opaque and as a resident subject to tax even if it 
receives a deduction for dividends paid to investors, but noting that some countries do not 
view such an entity as being “liable to tax”). This conclusion is consistent with paragraph 
8.5 of the Commentary to the OECD Model. Id. para. 30. 
The CIV Benefits Report also addresses whether a CIV is the beneficial owner of its income, 
that is, whether ownership in a CIV is equivalent to ownership of the underlying assets. Id. 
paras. 31–35. If it were not, the CIV would not be eligible for treaty benefits with respect to 
its income. Id. para. 31. The CIV Benefits Report concludes that a CIV is the beneficiary of 
its income because “[t]he investor has no right to the underlying assets. . . . [I]t is the 
manager of the CIV that has discretionary powers to manage the assets on behalf of the 
holders of interests in the CIV.” Id. paras. 32–33. 
 146 See, e.g., Letter from Keith Lawson, Senior Counsel, Inv. Company Inst., to Byung-
Cheol Kim, Dir. Corp. Tax Div., Korean Ministry of Strategy and Fin. (Apr. 13, 2012), 
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Once a CIV qualifies as resident, it is highly likely that it will be 
eligible for treaty benefits. In contrast, if RICs were subject to the treaty 
rules for partnerships, each RIC shareholder would have to qualify 
separately for treaty benefits. Given the great number of shareholders in a 
typical RIC, this would be an administrative nightmare, and many 
shareholders, especially those with small investments, would simply forego 
claiming treaty benefits because of the cost and administrative burdens.147 
In addition, this policy obviates the need to attempt to assign source basis 
taxes imposed on a RIC’s income to a particular shareholder when the RIC 
distributes the income. 
The concept of neutrality, however, has its limits. True neutrality is 
achieved only if a CIV’s income is subject to a single level of tax and the 
character of its income passes through to its owners. The CIV Benefits 
Report does not focus on the character of a CIV’s income in the hands of its 
owners. The drafters may have been concerned that by insisting on pass-
through treatment of the character of the income, it would have been 
difficult to distinguish between partnerships and CIVs. 
B.  Are RICs Qualified Persons Under Treaties? 
In all U.S. treaties negotiated within the last thirty years, a resident 
under Article 4 must also generally be a “qualified person” under the 
Limitation of Benefits (LOB) article to be eligible for treaty benefits.148 
The LOB article is intended to prevent treaty shopping, that is, the use of an 
entity formed in one of the signatory countries to receive income or transact 
business in the other signatory country but that is owned by (or whose 
income is substantially attributable to) residents of a third country that does 
 
https://www.ici.org/pdf/26044.pdf. The U.S.-Korea treaty was signed in 1976 and does not 
specifically address RICs. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the 
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and the Encouragement of 
International Trade and Investment, U.S.-Korea, June 4, 1976, 30 U.S.T. 5253. 
 147 If a taxpayer is eligible to claim treaty benefits to reduce source basis taxes but 
elects not to, he may not claim a credit for the foreign taxes that could have been reduced or 
refunded, since the foreign taxes may be treated as a “noncompulsory amount” under Treas. 
Reg. § 1.901-2(e)(5)(i) (as amended in 2013). 
 148 See, e.g., U.S.-U.K. Treaty, supra note 118, art. 23, paras. 1–2. Some older U.S. 
treaties do not contain an LOB provision. See Jeffrey L. Rubinger, Tax Planning with U.S. 
Income Tax Treaties Without LOB Provisions, 36 TAX MGM’T. INT’L J. 123 (2007); Jeffrey 
L. Rubinger, Treaty Shopping: Is it Still a Viable Option?, May 2007 CORP. BUS. TAX’N 
MONTHLY 15, 17 (noting that there are twelve treaties without LOB provisions). 
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not have a treaty with the United States.149 All modern U.S. treaties include 
a detailed LOB provision, but many of our trading partners do not share the 
same restrictive view of treaty shopping. The rationale for expansive LOB 
provisions is to limit the unilateral bestowal of treaty benefits on third-
country residents and thereby encourage these countries to enter into 
treaties with the United States so that the United States too can obtain 
benefits for its residents. 
How a RIC would be a “qualified person” under an LOB article is not 
entirely clear, and the inquiry has not received much commentary.150 A 
U.S. corporation may be a qualified person in various ways. First, a U.S. 
corporation is a qualified person if the principal class of its shares is 
regularly traded on one or more recognized stock exchanges.151 The LOB 
article treats a U.S. corporation as satisfying the LOB provisions if, inter 
alia, the corporation is publicly traded in the United States.152 Closed-end 
funds and ETFs should generally qualify as publicly traded. Open-end RICs 
would probably not satisfy the publicly traded exception since the shares 
are not publicly traded on one or more U.S. stock exchanges.153 
Another basis on which a U.S. corporation can be a qualified person is 
pursuant to the so-called base-ownership and base-erosion tests. These tests 
are satisfied if a U.S. corporation is 50%-or-more owned (by vote) by 
qualified persons for at least half of the taxable year and less than 50% of 
the corporation’s gross income is paid in the form of deductible payments 
 
 149 U.S. Model Technical Explanation, supra note 120, at 63 (“Article 22 contains anti-
treaty-shopping provisions that are intended to prevent residents of third countries from 
benefiting from what is intended to be a reciprocal agreement between two countries.”). The 
third country owners could be residents of a country that has a treaty with the source country 
but the terms of which are less favorable than the treaty in which the entity is formed. 
 150 See Brown, supra note 128, at 34 n. 26. 
 151 See, e.g., U.S.-U.K. Treaty, supra note 118, art. 23, para. 2(c)(i). The criteria for 
“regularly traded” and “recognized stock exchange” can be found in paragraph 7 of the LOB 
article. See id. paras. 7(a) (defining recognized stock exchanges), 7(e) (defining shares as 
regularly traded if 6% or more of the average shares outstanding are traded on the applicable 
exchange during the prior taxable year). 
 152 See U.S. Model Treaty, supra note 123, art. 22, para. 2(c). 
 153 For the United States, a recognized state exchange includes NASDAQ and any stock 
exchange registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. U.S. Model Treaty, 
supra note 123, art. 22, para. 5(a). In actual treaties, this clause is typically drafted so that a 
U.S. company is a qualified person where its shares are traded and not where they are 
registered. See, e.g., U.S.-U.K. Treaty, supra note 118, art. 23, para. 2(c)(i). 
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to persons who are not residents of the United States or the other signatory 
country.154 
Probably all U.S. RICs satisfy the base-ownership prong given that 
foreign investors likely constitute a small percentage of RIC’s 
shareholders.155 If, however, shares of a RIC are held through 
intermediaries such as brokerage houses, it is impossible to know with 
certainty whether the RIC satisfies the base-ownership prong.156 
If a RIC satisfies the base ownership test, it likely also satisfies the 
base erosion test. First, since open-end RICs cannot issue debt securities,157 
a RIC could not adjust its capital structure so that significant portions of its 
income could be paid to non-treaty residents in the form of tax-deductible 
interest. But since distributions of NCG, ICTI, and tax-exempt interest are 
deductible, such distributions would probably be treated as deductible 
payments for purposes of the base erosion test. Given that a RIC generally 
has only one class of stock158 and no non-bank debt, and a RIC distributes 
 
 154 U.S. Model Treaty, supra note 123, art. 22, para. 2(e). For these purposes, a U.S. 
person includes a U.S. individual, federal, state or local government, or publicly traded U.S. 
company. Id. art. 3, para. 1(a). The aim of the second prong of this test is to prevent 
nontreaty residents from capitalizing a company organized in a treaty country with a 
significant amount of debt (held by the nontreaty residents) and a small of amount of equity 
held by qualified persons. If the debt were substantial, a company could pay out its income 
as deductible interest to the nontreaty debt holders. 
 155 In a recent submission to the Korean government, the Investment Company Institute 
stated that RICs are generally owned “almost exclusively by U.S. investors” because of the 
unfavorable tax treatment of foreign investors and the fact that RICs are almost never 
registered for sale outside of the United States. See Letter from Keith Lawson, Senior 
Counsel, Inv. Company Inst., to Byung-Cheol Kim, Dir. Corp. Tax Div., Korean Ministry of 
Strategy and Fin., supra note 146, app. at 3. 
 156 For a discussion, see U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., 
FOREIGN PORTFOLIO HOLDINGS OF U.S. SECURITIES 10–11 (Apr. 2015). The same issue arises 
in the case of tax-exempt shareholders such as IRAs that invest in a fund through an 
intermediary.  See Colon, supra note 18, at 830 n. 248. 
 157 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(a). However, open-end companies may borrow directly from a 
bank to finance a portion of their portfolio purchases. Id. § 80a-18(f)(1) (an open-end 
company may not directly issue debt securities, but it may borrow from a bank if 
immediately after such borrowing, the company has an asset coverage of at least 300%). 
Closed-end funds may issue debt securities and preferred stock under limited circumstances, 
in addition to borrowing from banks to fund portfolio purchases. Id. § 80a-18(a)(1) 
(requiring that immediately after such issuance of debt, a fund have asset coverage of at least 
300%); id. § 80a-18(a)(2) (requiring that immediately after such issuance of preferred stock, 
a fund have asset coverage of at least 200%). 
 158 Prior to 2010, a RIC generally had to distribute dividends pro rata. See I.R.C. § 
562(c). This rule was repealed for publicly offered RICs in The Regulated Investment 
520 Virginia Tax Review [Vol.  35:483 
 
generally all of its income, if qualified persons hold 50% of the votes, it 
generally will not be possible for 50% or more of the RIC’s gross income to 
be paid to persons who are not residents of the U.S. or the other signatory 
country.159 Given that many open-end RICs have currently begun to limit 
sales of shares to non-U.S. residents, whether a RIC is a qualified person 
under the base erosion/ownership tests may become an increasingly moot 
issue.160 
Finally, many recent U.S. treaties permit the competent authorities of 
each country to agree to grant treaty benefits with respect to an item of 
income if it is determined that the “establishment, acquisition or 
maintenance” of the entity “and the conduct of its operations did not have 
as one of its principal purposes the obtaining of [treaty] benefits.”161 Given 
 
Company Modernization Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-325, § 307(a), 124 Stat. 3537, 3550. 
The Investment Company Act of 1940 contains limitations on the capital structure of an 
open-end RIC. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(f)(1)–(2). 
 159 Since gross income is income reduced by expenses, and a RIC’s income is generally 
distributed proportionately to share holdings, third country residents could never receive 
more than 50% of the RIC income (which is less than gross income) without owning more 
than 50% of the payor RIC. The base erosion test was certainly not envisioned to apply to an 
entity like a RIC that deducts payments to equity holders. Apparently treaty benefits have 
not been denied for failure to qualify under an LOB provision. See Brown, supra note 128, 
at 34 n. 26. 
 160 See, e.g., Laura Saunders, Fidelity Bans U.S. Investors Overseas From Buying 
Mutual Funds, WALL ST. J. ONLINE (Jul. 1, 2014, 7:07 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
fidelity-bans-overseas-investors-from-buying-mutual-funds-1404246385. In informal 
conversations with the author, professionals in the industry have stated that funds have 
begun to restrict sales to foreign residents because of the concern that such sales could be 
treated as a public offering under foreign law. 
There are other ways a company can be eligible for treaty benefits even if it is not a 
qualified person, but these will generally not apply to RICs. Under the equivalent 
beneficiary provision, a company will be entitled to treaty benefits if, inter alia, 95% or more 
of a company’s shares are owned directly or indirectly by seven or fewer persons who are 
equivalent beneficiaries. See, e.g., U.S.-U.K. Treaty, supra note 118, art. 23, para. 3(a). A 
RIC would not qualify under this provision because of the large number of its shareholders. 
This provision is discussed infra Part. V.D. Even if the recipient of an item of income is not 
a qualified person under the LOB article, the resident can obtain treaty benefits if he is 
engaged in the active conduct of a trade or business in the residence country and the income 
derived in the source state is “is derived in connection with, or is incidental to, that trade or 
business.” U.S. Model Treaty, supra note 123, art. 22, para. 3. A RIC cannot qualify under 
this provision because the business of making or managing investments for its own account 
is excluded unless the activities are banking, insurance, or securities activities carried on by 
a bank, insurance company, or registered securities dealer. Id. 
 161 U.S. Model Treaty, supra note 123, art. 22, para. 4. 
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the significant regulatory burdens imposed on U.S. RICs, if an open-end 
U.S. RIC were to become majority-owned by foreign investors who are not 
treaty residents, the RIC should be able to show that it was not established 
or maintained to obtain treaty benefits. Furthermore, if an open-end RIC 
permits any foreign investor to acquire shares, the RIC should be able to 
show that the acquisition did not have a principal purpose of obtaining 
treaty benefits. A RIC established solely for the non-treaty investors, 
however, might be problematic. There are no published rulings on the 
criteria that competent authorities apply to make this determination in the 
case of an investment company. 
If a RIC is treated as a qualified person under an income tax treaty, it is 
entitled to treaty benefits with respect to dividends, interest, and capital 
gains arising in the source country. The maximum dividend rate generally 
depends on the RIC’s ownership interest in the distributing corporation. 
Tax treaties generally limit dividend source basis taxation to 15%, but this 
rate is reduced to 5% if the beneficial owner of the dividends is a company 
that owns 10% or more of voting power of the company paying the 
dividend.162 In recent treaties, the United States generally negotiates to 
include a 0% rate if the dividend recipient is a pension or a company that 
owns 80% or more of the voting power of the company paying the 
dividend.163 It is highly unlikely that a RIC would qualify for the 0% rate 
because of the tax and securities law diversification requirements.164 
In addition to a reduced treaty rate on dividends, if a RIC were a 
qualified person for treaty purposes, any interest that was subject to source 
basis taxation in the absence of a treaty would likely be tax-exempt in the 
hands of the RIC, as most treaties generally provide for a 0% rate on source 
basis interest.165 Finally, any capital gains or derivatives income that is 
otherwise subject to source basis taxation is generally exempt.166 
 
 162 U.S. Model Treaty, supra note 123, art. 10, para. 2. 
 163 See, e.g., U.S.-U.K. Treaty, supra note 118, art. 10, paras. 3(a)–(b). 
 164 The reason is that investments in any one issuer above a certain percentage of a 
fund’s assets or the issuer’s voting shares are not counted for purposes of the diversification 
tests of a mutual fund. See I.R.C. § 851(b)(3)(A)–(B). 
 165 See, e.g., U.S.-U.K. Treaty, supra note 118, art. 11, para. 1 (interest is only taxable 
in state of residence). Some few treaties permit source basis taxation of interest. See 
Rubinger, Tax Planning with U.S. Income Tax Treaties Without LOB Provisions, supra note 
148, n.18. 
 166 See, e.g., U.S.-U.K. Treaty, supra note 118, art. 13, para. 5 (gains other than gains 
from real property are only taxable in the residence country); art. 22 (other income, which 
includes income from derivatives, is exempt from source basis taxation). 
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C.  Special U.S. Treaty Rules for RIC Dividends 
The above analysis has focused on whether a RIC is a qualified person 
for purposes of a tax treaty. Although U.S. treaty policy has not explicitly 
focused on the issue of whether a U.S. RIC is a qualified person, recent 
U.S. treaties have included special provisions that apply to dividends paid 
by a RIC to a foreign treaty resident. These provisions prevent a foreign 
investor from exploiting a RIC’s quasi pass-through regime and garnering a 
reduced rate on dividends paid by a RIC that it could not otherwise obtain if 
it invested directly in the RIC’s assets. 
In treaties containing these special provisions,167 the 15% and 0% 
dividend rates apply to dividends paid by RICs only in limited 
circumstances. Under the 2006 U.S. Model Treaty, a foreign RIC 
shareholder is not entitled to the 5% dividend rate regardless of the 
shareholder’s ownership percentage of the RIC; the 15% rate applies unless 
the recipient is a pension plan, in which case the 0% rate applies.168 The 
Technical Explanation to the 2006 U.S. Model Treaty states that these 
limitations are intended to prevent a treaty resident who desires to hold a 
diversified U.S. portfolio from purchasing 10% or more of the shares of a 
RIC holding a diversified U.S. portfolio, making the dividends paid by the 
RIC subject to the 5% rate rather than the 15% rate that would apply if the 
treaty resident invested directly in the underlying shares.169 
In actual tax treaties, the dividend limitation applies to entities 
denominated “pooled investment vehicles” (PIVs). A PIV is a person 
whose assets consist wholly or mainly of real estate or stock, securities, 
currencies or derivatives, whose gross income consists wholly or mainly of 
dividends, interest, capital gains, rents, and other income and gains from 
real property, and who is either exempt from tax, subject to tax at a special 
rate, or is entitled to a deduction for dividends in computing income or 
gains.170 RICs are considered to be PIVs.171 
In the U.S.-U.K. treaty, for example, a dividend paid by a U.S. RIC (a 
PIV under the treaty) to a U.K. resident is not eligible for the 5% rate, 
regardless of the percentage of the RIC’s shares owned by the U.K. 
 
 167 All recent treaties contain this provision.   
 168 U.S. Model Treaty, supra note 123, art. 10, para. 4(a). Special rules also apply to 
dividends paid by REITs. Id. para. 4(a)(i)–(iii). 
 169 U.S. Technical Explanation, supra note 120, at 36. 
 170 See, e.g., U.S.-U.K. Treaty, supra note 118, art. 10, para. 10(b) (defining PIV). 
 171 See, e.g., U.S.-U.K. Technical Explanation, supra note 142, at 41. 
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resident.172 A dividend paid by a RIC to a U.K. pension is eligible for the 
0% rate, provided the RIC’s assets consist wholly or mainly of shares, 
securities, currencies, or derivatives of such assets.173 The Technical 
Explanation to the U.S.-U.K. treaty echoes the justification given in the 
U.S. Model Technical Explanation for the limitation of the 5% rate for U.K. 
investors in U.S. RICs. The dividend rate limitation is designed to prevent a 
passive U.K. investor from converting a 15% tax on U.S. source dividends 
to a 5% tax by purchasing a 10% or greater interest in a RIC that holds a 
diversified portfolio of U.S stocks.174 
The justification for this special treatment given in the U.S. Model 
Technical Explanation and other treaties is somewhat questionable. The 
U.K. Technical Explanation strangely equivocates when it states: “[i]f the 
RIC is a pure conduit, there may be no U.S. tax costs to interposing the 
RIC.”175 To the extent that a RIC holds only U.S. stocks and the RIC earns 
only capital gains and U.S. source dividends, this statement is accurate, and 
the provisions prevent converting the 15% tax on those dividends to 5%. 
But as a description of a RIC’s fiscal taxonomy under current law, a RIC is 
not a pure conduit for either U.S. or foreign investors, especially with 
respect to a RIC’s foreign source income. Since a RIC is not a pure conduit, 
there are tax costs to interposing the RIC for foreign source income: the 
RIC’s foreign source income that would otherwise be exempt from U.S. tax 
now becomes subject to a 15% tax for treaty investors. 
Finally, it is somewhat strange that recent treaties treat payments by 
 
 172 U.S.-U.K. Treaty, supra note 118, art. 10, para. 4, amended by Protocol Amending 
the Convention Between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for the Avoidance 
of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income 
and on Capital Gains, Signed At London on 24th July 2001, U.S.-U.K., art. II, July 19, 2002, 
T.I.A.S. No. 13,161. 
 173 Id. The provisions dealing with REITs follow the 2006 Treaty Model and limit the 
availability of the 15% rate (for nonpensions) and 0% (for pensions). Id. 
 174 U.S.-U.K. Technical Explanation, supra note 142, at 42. 
 175 Id. This same rationale is found in other treaties, although its formulation differs 
slightly. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION TO THE 
CONVENTION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND 
GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND FOR THE AVOIDANCE OF DOUBLE TAXATION AND THE PREVENTION 
OF FISCAL EVASION WITH RESPECT TO TAXES ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL GAINS SIGNED AT 
DUBLIN ON JULY 28, 1997, AND THE PROTOCOL SIGNED AT DUBLIN ON JULY 28, 1997, art. 10 
(1997) (“Since the RIC may be a pure conduit, there may be no U.S. tax costs to interposing 
the RIC in the chain of ownership.”). The special rule for withholding rates on dividends 
paid by RICs and REITs is contained in thirty-seven U.S. income tax treaties. 
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PIVs specially and all note that RICs are PIVs, but there is no discussion of 
how a RIC or PIV is a qualified person under the LOB article. Perhaps the 
drafters rely on an unstated assumption that nonpublicly traded RICs are 
qualified persons because they would likely satisfy the base ownership and 
base erosion tests. 
D.  Treaty Shopping and Foreign Investors 
Unlike the U.S. Model Treaty, the OECD Model Treaty does not 
contain a separate LOB article, as many countries have not historically 
shared the same concern with treaty shopping as the United States.176 The 
OECD’s recent BEPS project is firm evidence that this laissez-faire attitude 
is certainly on the wane.177 Treaty shopping refers generally to the strategy 
employed by a resident of a country that does not have an income tax treaty 
with the source country (the country of origin of interest, dividends, gains, 
etc.) to obtain treaty benefits by using an entity formed in a country with 
which the source country has a treaty.178 If the country in which the entity 
is formed has a benign tax regime for extracting source country income, 
e.g., a dividend exemption system or lax rules on income stripping, a 
foreign investor from a non-treaty country can significantly improve his or 
her after-tax returns by investing through a treaty-qualified entity. By 
excluding all foreign source income from qualifying as qualified interest or 
dividend income in the final foreign RIC legislation, Congress ensured that 
all foreign source income would be subject to an additional 30% U.S. tax 
when distributed (or less if a foreign shareholder’s country of residence had 
a treaty with the United States), whether or not the RIC’s foreign source 
income actually benefits from a U.S. treaty. 
 Because RICs do not pay tax on their distributed income, they could 
 
 176 The OECD Model Commentary to article 1 discusses possible approaches to treaty 
shopping, including adopting a LOB provision similar to the typical U.S. LOB treaty 
provisions. OECD Model Commentary, supra note 120, para. 20. 
 177 See BEPS Action Plan, supra note 129. 
 178 It also describes a situation where an investor is from a country that has a treaty with 
the source country but uses an entity formed in a country that has more favorable treaty 
provisions with the source country than the residence treaty. For example, if under the 
investor’s treaty with the source country, the dividend rate is 15%, but under the treaty of a 
third country, the rate is 10%, it may be advantageous to interpose an entity formed in the 
third country to make investments in the source country. This structure is dependent on 
being able to extract the income from the third country with little or no additional tax 
imposed by the third country or being able to receive a credit against residence taxation for 
any tax imposed by the third country. 
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potentially be vehicles for treaty shopping. The CIV Benefits Report 
focuses extensively on this issue,179 which is arguably the key to 
understanding why the foreign RIC provisions do not provide look-through 
for foreign source income. 
CIVs with foreign investors present a formidable challenge for treaty 
policy. It is difficult to accommodate under the current international tax 
regime the competing goals to tax CIV investors, both foreign and 
domestic, under domestic law on the same basis as if they had earned their 
share of the CIV’s underlying income (a pass-through approach), but also to 
treat CIVs as treaty residents with access to reduced treaty rates on their 
foreign source income (an entity approach). The combination of these two 
policies can result in a foreign investor being able to achieve a lower rate 
(or zero rate) on a CIV’s foreign source income than he could obtain if he 
invested directly. The desire of the United States to prevent treaty shopping 
probably leads it to reject a look-through approach for a RIC’s foreign 
source income. As demonstrated below, however, this concern is probably 
exaggerated, and foreign investment in global RICs is unnecessarily 
discouraged. 
To focus on how these conflicts arise, assume two investors, one U.S. 
and one foreign, each owning 50% of the shares of a RIC that earns $100 of 
foreign source interest and $100 of foreign source dividends. The RIC 
distributes all of its ICTI. The foreign source interest is not subject to 
withholding by the source country (as is typical for most portfolio-type 
interest), but dividends are subject to a 30% withholding tax unless reduced 
by a treaty. When a treaty applies to a dividend, the withholding tax is 15%. 
The following scenarios compare the tax consequences of earning 
foreign source investment income through a RIC and earning the same 
income directly (or equivalently through a partnership), and take treaties 
into account. For income earned through a RIC, the relevant treaties are the 
treaty between the source country and the United States and the treaty 
between the foreign shareholder’s country of residence and the United 
States. For income earned directly, the relevant treaty is that between the 
foreign investor’s country of residence and the source country. Finally, for 
each scenario below, it is assumed that if the RIC makes the section 853 
election, the foreign shareholder is only taxed on the dividend actually 
received and not the dividend grossed up for foreign taxes.180 
 
 179 OECD, Treaty Benefits CIVs, supra note 126, paras. 52–57. 
 180 I.R.C. § 853(b)(2)(A). If foreign shareholders are taxed on a RIC’s foreign taxes, the 
analysis does not change. In fact, there is an even greater disparity between the tax 
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 1. Scenario 1: No Treaty Applies 
In the absence of any tax treaty, the RIC’s income is $200 and the 
source country withholds $30 (30%*$100). If the RIC elects not to pass 
through the foreign taxes but instead deduct them, each shareholder 
receives $85.181 If the RIC elects to pass through the foreign tax credit, the 
foreign and U.S. shareholder receive an $85 dividend, but the U.S. 
shareholder reports an additional $15 of income on which it can claim a 
credit.182 
If the dividends received by the RIC are qualified dividends, the 
dividend paid to the U.S. shareholder is taxed partially as ordinary income 
and partially as qualified dividend income.183 For the U.S. shareholder, 
earning the foreign source income through the RIC leaves the shareholder 
in roughly the same position had the shareholder earned directly his or her 
share of the underlying income, provided the fund makes the foreign tax 
credit election.184 
The foreign shareholder is taxed at 30% on the $85 RIC dividend,185 
leaving the shareholder with $59.5 on a pretax return of $100, which results 
in an effective tax rate of 40.5% (($15+$25.5)/$100). Note, this rate is 
higher than either the source country tax rate or the U.S. tax rate. This 
results from treating the foreign taxes as a deduction at the RIC level, i.e., 
they reduce income distributed to the foreign shareholder. 
If the foreign investor had earned the foreign source income directly, it 
would have paid $15 (30%*$50) of taxes on the dividend and $0 on the 
 
consequences of direct investment and investing through a RIC.  
 181 See supra note 62. 
 182 See I.R.C. § 853(a)(1); § 901(a). 
 183 I.R.C. § 1(h)(11)(C)(ii) (qualified dividend is a dividend from stock readily tradable 
on an established securities market in the United States). If the dividends are not qualified, 
the entire RIC dividend is taxed as ordinary income. 
 184 See supra note 62. Even if the foreign tax rate on the dividend income (30%) is 
higher than the shareholder’s U.S. rate, most U.S. shareholders should be able to credit the 
entire $15, since the average rate on foreign source income is 15% (50%*30% + 50%*0%). 
In foreign tax credit parlance, since all of the income is in same basket, the passive basket, it 
is possible to average the foreign taxes. Since a RIC can deduct investment expenses against 
ICTI, see I.R.C. § 852(b)(2)(A), a RIC shareholder may be slightly better off earning income 
through a RIC since those expenses could probably not be deducted if the shareholder 
incurred them directly. See supra Part II.B. 
 185 See I.R.C. § 871(a)(1) (taxing U.S. source FDAP income of nonresident aliens at 
30% tax); I.R.C. § 881(a) (taxing U.S. source FDAP income of foreign corporations at 30% 
tax). 
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interest, leaving $85 after-tax income, which is an effective tax rate of 15%. 
If, however, the foreign investor’s country of residence had a treaty with the 
source country, the withholding tax would have been reduced to $7.5 
(15%*$50). 
 2. Scenario 2: U.S. Treaty Applies to Source Country Income 
In this scenario, the United States has a treaty with the source country, 
but the residence country does not have a treaty with either the United 
States or the source country. The RIC’s source basis taxes are reduced from 
$30 to $15 (15%*$100), and each investor receives $92.5. If the RIC elects 
to pass through the foreign taxes, the U.S. investor will have income of 
$100, but may claim a foreign tax credit of $7.5. Again, the U.S. investor is 
roughly in the same after-tax position had he or she earned the foreign 
source income directly. 
The foreign shareholder is taxed at 30% on the $92.5 RIC dividend 
leaving $64.75, which results in an effective tax rate of 35.25% 
(($7.5+$27.75)/$100). Again, this rate is higher than either the source 
country tax rate (15%) or the U.S. tax rate (30%) because the source taxes 
reduce the RIC dividend paid to the foreign shareholder. 
If the foreign investor had earned the foreign source income directly, 
he or she would have paid $15 (30%*$50) of taxes on the dividend and $0 
on the interest, leaving $85 of after-tax income. If, however, the foreign 
investor’s country of residence had a treaty with the source country, the 
withholding tax would have been reduced to $7.5 (15%*$50). 
 3. Scenario 3: U.S. Treaty Applies to Source and Residence Country 
Income 
In this scenario, the United States has a treaty both with the source 
country and the foreign investor’s country of residence. This reduces the 
dividend rate to 15%, and each investor receives a RIC dividend of $92.5. If 
the RIC elects to pass through the foreign taxes, the U.S. investor is taxed 
on $100, but receives a foreign tax credit of $7.5. The U.S. investor is 
roughly in the same after-tax position had he or she earned the foreign 
source income directly. 
The foreign investor pays tax of $13.88 (15%*$92.5) on the RIC 
dividend leaving $78.63, which results in an effective tax rate of 21.38% 
(($7.5+$13.88)/$100). As in the previous examples, this rate is higher than 
either the foreign or U.S. tax rate because the foreign taxes are in essence 
deducted at the RIC level rather than credited at the investor level. 
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In the absence of a treaty with the source country and in the case of 
direct investment, the foreign investor would have paid $15 (30%*$50) of 
taxes on the dividend and $0 on the interest, leaving $85 after-tax income. 
If the foreign investor’s country of residence had a treaty with the source 
country, the withholding tax would have been reduced to $7.5 (15%*$50). 
Table 1186 summarizes and compares the tax consequences to the 
foreign investor of investing through a RIC and earning the foreign source 
income directly. 
TABLE 1 
 
  
RIC 
 
DIRECT 
 
 
SCENARIO 1 SCENARIO 2 SCENARIO 3 NO TREATY TREATY 
FS DIV & INT 100  100  100  100  100  
SOURCE WH 
TAX (15) (7.5) (7.5) (15) (7.5) 
RIC INC 85  92.5  92.5  
  US WH TAX (25.5) (27.75) (13.88)    
ATCF 59.5  64.75  78.6  85  92.5  
ETR 40.5% 35.25% 21.38% 15% 7.5% 
For treaty shopping to be a viable strategy,187 the total taxes paid to 
both the source country and intermediate country (in this example, the 
United States) must be less than the source country taxes that the investor 
would have paid if he or she had earned the source country income directly 
(or through a partnership). Because the United States taxes a RIC’s foreign 
source income when distributed to a foreign investor, the foreign investor is 
always worse off investing through a RIC than earning the foreign source 
income directly. 
In various bills that preceded the enactment of the foreign RIC 
 
 186 In the following tables, “FS Div & Int” refers to foreign source dividend and 
interest; “ATCF” refers to after-tax cash flow; and “ETR” refers to effective tax rate. 
 187 The source country might view the granting of treaty benefits to a RIC with foreign 
investors as a type of treaty shopping, especially in the case where the third-country investor 
would not be entitled to treaty benefits if he or she invested directly. In such case, the source 
country foregoes the 15% tax on source country dividends, but the U.S. gets the residual 
15%, even though the dividends are paid to foreign investors. That is to say, had the third-
country investor earned the foreign source dividends directly, the source country would have 
earned $15 of tax revenue. By a foreign investor investing indirectly through a RIC, the $15 
tax is reduced to $7.5 because of the U.S. treaty, but the United States collects an additional 
$6.375 of tax (if the third-country investor is treaty eligible) or an additional $12.75 (if the 
third-country investor is not treaty eligible). 
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provisions, foreign source interest income that was exempt from source 
basis taxation without regard to a treaty would have constituted a qualified 
interest dividend and therefore been exempt from U.S. tax when distributed 
to a foreign investor. Under that approach, tax-exempt foreign source 
income would have been eligible for look-through treatment and would 
have been tax-exempt when paid by a RIC to a foreign investor. Other 
foreign source income, however, would not have been eligible for look-
through and would have been treated as a U.S. source dividend when 
distributed. 
The potential benefits to foreign investors if the United States had 
adopted a look-through regime for foreign source income can be seen by 
comparing the after-tax cash flows to a foreign investor in the above 
scenarios with the after-tax cash flows a foreign investor would have earned 
had the United States adopted complete look-through for foreign source 
income. In the case of look-through treatment for foreign source income, 
any dividend distributed, to the extent it was attributable to a RIC’s foreign 
source income, would have been exempt.188 
In Scenario 1, where the foreign source dividend is taxed at 30% by the 
source country, the RIC would receive $170 of after-tax foreign income, 
and there would be no additional U.S. tax when it was distributed to a 
foreign investor. The foreign investor would receive $85, the same amount 
he or she would have received had the investor directly earned the source 
country income. If, however, the foreign investor’s country of residence 
had a treaty with the source country, the investor would end up with $92.5. 
 In Scenario 2, the source country would impose a 15% tax on the 
$100 dividend paid to the RIC. When the RIC distributes $92.5 to the 
foreign investor, there would be no additional U.S. tax. If the foreign 
investor would have been entitled to treaty benefits with respect to the 
source country dividend, the foreign investor would be in the same after-tax 
position had he or she invested directly. 
If, however, a foreign investor would not have been entitled to treaty 
benefits for source country dividends had he or she invested directly, by 
investing through the RIC, the foreign investor would succeed in using a 
U.S. treaty to lower source basis taxes. In this scenario — full pass-through 
treatment of foreign source income and investment in a RIC by a non-treaty 
foreign investor — a foreign investor can use a U.S. treaty to obtain indirect 
 
 188 This also assumes that income earned by a RIC that is sourced by the residence of 
the recipient, e.g., swap income, would be treated as if it were earned directly by the foreign 
shareholders. 
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benefits for which he or she would not be eligible if the investor had 
invested directly (or through a partnership). This is a classic example of 
treaty shopping.189 
The results in Scenario 3 are similar to Scenario 2: since there is no 
U.S. tax on the RIC dividend, the existence of a U.S. treaty with the 
residence country is irrelevant. Consequently, the foreign investor is in the 
same after-tax cash position as if he or she invested directly with treaty 
benefits. If the investor were not eligible for treaty benefits, investing 
directly would leave him or her with less cash after-tax than investing 
through a RIC. 
Table 2 summarizes and compares the tax consequences to the foreign 
investor of investing through a RIC under a full look-through regime with 
directly earning the foreign source income. One can see the potential for 
treaty shopping by comparing the after-tax cash flows in Scenario 2 with 
the after-tax cash flows in a direct investment with no treaty scenario. By 
investing through a RIC entitled to treaty benefits, a foreign investor 
improves his or her after-tax cash position compared to when the investor 
invests directly. 
 
TABLE 2 
  
RIC 
 
DIRECT 
 
 
SCENARIO 1 SCENARIO 2 SCENARIO 3 NO TREATY TREATY 
FS DIV & INT 100  100  100  100  100  
SOURCE WH TAX (15) (7.5) (7.5) (15) (7.5) 
RIC INC 85  92.5  92.5  
  US WH TAX 0.0  0.0  0.0     
ATCF 85.0  92.50  92.5  85  92.5  
ETR 15.0% 7.5% 7.5% 15% 7.5% 
Finally, it is instructive to compare the above results with the tax 
consequences to a foreign investor had the foreign RIC provisions provided 
look-through only for untaxed foreign source interest. This approach would 
have eliminated the potential for treaty shopping for foreign source interest 
earned through a RIC, because the interest income would be tax-free for a 
 
 189 This would also be the case if the foreign investor’s country of residence had a 
treaty with the source country but the dividend rate was greater than the dividend rate under 
the U.S. treaty with the source country. If foreign source income were passed through to a 
foreign investor, there would be no additional U.S. tax when the foreign source income was 
distributed by the RIC. The foreign investor would thus get the benefit of the lower U.S. 
treaty rate on the foreign source income. 
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foreign investor whether earned through a RIC or earned directly.190 A 
foreign investor would generally be worse off earning foreign dividends 
through a RIC because of the additional layer of U.S. tax when the RIC 
distributed the income. Thus, global fixed income RICs would have 
benefitted under such a regime, but global equity RICs would have been 
penalized. 
To illustrate, in Scenario 1, where there is no source or residence 
treaty, there would still be a source tax of $15 on the foreign dividend, but 
the U.S. withholding tax would be reduced to $10.5 (($50-$15)*30%) 
because the part of the dividend that was attributable to foreign source 
interest would qualify as an IRD. The total taxes paid would be $25.5. In 
contrast, a direct investment by a non-treaty foreign investor would 
generate foreign taxes of $15 ($50*30%), and $7.5 ($50*15%) in the case 
of a treaty investor. 
In Scenario 2, where there is a U.S. treaty with the source country, the 
RIC would receive $185 ($200 reduced by a 15% tax on a $100 dividend). 
When the RIC distributes $92.5 to the foreign investor, the United States 
would collect another $12.75 ($42.5*30%), for total foreign taxes of 
$20.25. If the foreign investor had invested directly, he or she would have 
paid source country tax of $15 ($50*30%) without a treaty and $7.5 
($50*15%) with a treaty. Direct investment still dominates indirect 
investment because there is U.S. tax imposed on the foreign source 
dividend. 
In Scenario 3, where there is a U.S. treaty with the residence country, 
the RIC would receive $185 ($200 reduced by 15% tax on $100 dividend). 
When the RIC distributes $92.5 to the foreign investor, the United States 
would collect another $6.38 (15%*$42.5), for a total tax paid by the foreign 
investor of $13.88. If the foreign investor had invested directly, he or she 
would have paid source country tax of $15 (30% of $50 of dividend 
income) without a treaty and $7.5 with a treaty. 
Table 3 summarizes and compares the tax consequences to the foreign 
investor of investing through a RIC under a look-through regime for tax-
exempt foreign source interest with earning the foreign source income 
directly. Table 3 demonstrates that a foreign investor can improve his or her 
 
 190 In a submission to the Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of 
Representatives, the Investment Company Institute noted that this language would 
“eliminate the U.S. withholding tax barrier to foreign investment in U.S. funds” while 
limiting the potential for treaty shopping. Impact of U.S. Tax Rules on International 
Competitiveness: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 106th Cong. 200 (1999) 
(statement of the Investment Company Institute). 
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after-tax cash flow by earning foreign source dividends through a RIC 
where the foreign investor’s country of residence does not have a treaty 
with the source country but has a treaty with the United States (and the 
United States has a treaty with the source country). 
TABLE 3 
 
  
RIC 
 
DIRECT 
 
 
SCENARIO 1 SCENARIO 2 SCENARIO 3 NO TREATY TREATY 
FS DIV & INT 100  100  100  100  100  
SOURCE WH TAX (15) (7.5) (7.5) (15) (7.5) 
RIC INC 85  92.5  92.5  
  US WH TAX (10.5) (12.8) (6.38)    
ATCF 74.5  79.75  86.13  85  92.5  
ETR 25.5% 20.25% 13.88% 15% 7.5% 
E.  Is Treaty Shopping by RICs a Real Concern? 
In the case of look-through treatment for all foreign source income (or 
only tax-exempt foreign source income), a foreign investor may be able to 
improve his or her after-tax cash flows by investing through a RIC instead 
of investing directly. One can see this by comparing the after-tax cash flows 
in Scenario 2 in Table 2 and Scenario 3 in Table 3 with the respective after-
tax cash flows accruing to an investor resident in a country that does not 
have a treaty with the source country. The reason that the after-tax cash 
flows are greater in Scenario 2 in Table 2 is that the source basis tax on 
dividends is reduced because of the U.S. treaty, and there is no residual 
U.S. tax on the RIC dividends. In Table 3, the source basis tax on dividends 
is reduced because of the U.S. treaty, and U.S. tax is imposed only on the 
after-source-tax amount of the foreign source dividends. In essence, the 
(reduced) source taxes are deducted prior to the application of U.S. tax, and 
the sum of the source and U.S. taxes is slightly less than the source taxes 
that would have been imposed in the case of direct investment without a 
treaty. 
The treaty shopping potential highlighted in Tables 2 and 3 may be 
more illusory than real. In Table 3 (pass-through treatment only for untaxed 
foreign source income), investing through a RIC improves after-tax cash 
flows compared to direct investment only if the foreign investor’s country 
of residence has a treaty with the United States but not with the source 
country. This is unlikely given that many European trading and investment 
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partners have entered into a significantly greater number of treaties than the 
United States. The Netherlands, for example, has entered into over 100 tax 
treaties compared with over sixty for the United States.191 
More importantly, the above scenarios ignore the residence country 
treatment of the foreign taxes paid and focus solely on comparing the after-
tax cash flows of a foreign investor, which implicitly treats all foreign taxes 
as expenses. To the extent a foreign investor can credit any direct foreign 
taxes paid (both U.S. taxes imposed on RIC dividends and source taxes paid 
in the case of direct investment) against his or her residence basis taxes, the 
treaty advantages garnered by investing through a RIC largely disappear, 
and a foreign investor will always be better off by investing directly than 
through a RIC. 
To illustrate, assume that a foreign investor pays a 15% residence tax 
on RIC dividends and on all direct investment income. In a regime in which 
only untaxed foreign interest is passed through (Scenario 3 in Table 3), the 
foreign investor will receive $86.13 of cash from the RIC ($92.5 less U.S. 
tax of $6.38) and will owe residence tax of $13.88 ($92.5*15%). He or she 
can credit against the residence liability the U.S. tax of $6.38, leaving 
$78.63 of cash ($86.13 less $7.5 of residence tax liability). In contrast, 
direct investment would leave the foreign investor with $85 of cash — the 
source country tax is $15 and since the residence liability is also $15, the 
investor receives a credit of $15, leaving $85. 
In a regime in which all foreign source income is passed through 
(Scenario 3 in Table 2), the foreign investor will receive $92.5 of cash from 
the RIC and will owe residence tax of $13.88 ($92.5*15%). This leaves 
$78.63 of cash. In contrast, direct investment would leave the foreign 
investor with $85 of cash — the source country tax is $15, and since the 
residence liability is also $15, the investor receives a credit of $15, leaving 
$85. 
When a foreign investor can fully credit any direct source basis taxes 
against his or her residence tax liability, investing directly yields higher tax 
cash flows than investing through a RIC. If we assume that investors are 
rational, treaty shopping should not be a concern. 
The legislative history to the foreign RIC provisions is silent on why 
 
 191 See Overview of Treaty Countries, BELASTINGDIENST [TAX & CUSTOMS 
ADMINISTRATION], http:// www.belastingdienst.nl /wps / wcm / connect / bldcontenten / 
belastingdienst/individuals/tax_arrangements/tax_treaties/overview_of_treaty_countries/; 
United States Income Tax Treaties - A to Z, THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE (SERVICE), 
https://www.irs.gov/Businesses/International-Businesses/United-States-Income-Tax-
Treaties—-A-to-Z. 
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look-through treatment was not adopted for foreign source income, 
including tax-exempt foreign source interest. Hence it is difficult to know 
with certainty why it was not part of the final legislation. The above 
examples demonstrate that the treaty shopping concern is probably 
overblown in the case of untaxed foreign source income. 
In a regime that provides for full look-through for all foreign source 
income, the analysis is slightly more complex. A foreign investor benefits 
by investing through a RIC only in cases where the residence country does 
not allow a credit for direct foreign taxes or the foreign investor is not 
subject to residence taxation. An investor could be tax-exempt if either the 
entity was a pension or charity or the residence country did not tax the 
foreign source investment income of its residents. 
For the pensions and charities, one can probably assume that such 
entities do not invest in RICs or that they could avoid source basis taxation 
if they invested directly.192 If, however, they are subject to the same source 
basis taxation as other foreign investors and do not benefit by a treaty, 
investing through a RIC could improve their after-tax cash flows since such 
entities are not taxable and any taxes are truly expenses. 
Certain countries, e.g., the Cayman Islands, do not tax the foreign 
source income of entities formed under their laws.193 If a full look-through 
regime for foreign source income were adopted, foreign investors that 
invest through entities formed in these countries could invest in a RIC and 
obtain the benefits of U.S. treaties to lower their after-tax cash flows, even 
though the investors may not have been able to obtain the same benefits had 
they directly invested. 
There is unfortunately no precise data on the value of shares of U.S. 
RICs held by residents of (or entities formed in) such countries or a 
breakdown of the type of RICs held by foreigners. Thus one cannot know 
whether foreigners currently avoid global funds or invest in such funds 
regardless of the U.S. tax treatment, whether foreigners migrated to U.S.-
focused funds when the foreign RIC provisions were enacted, or whether 
non-treaty residents would migrate to foreign funds if the U.S. were to 
enact a full look-through regime. 
The total value of shares in open-end funds held by all foreign 
 
 192 See, e.g., U.S.-U.K. Treaty, supra note 118, art. 10, para. 3(b) (0% tax rate on 
dividends paid to a pension). 
 193 http://www.dci.gov.ky/portal/page/portal/ivbhome/doingbusiness (“The government 
does not impose personal or corporation income taxes and there are no taxes on profits and 
gains from investments.”).  
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investors at the end of 2014 was $606 billion, which represents an increase 
of roughly 379% since the end of 2005.194 During this same period, foreign 
investors’ percentage ownership of all RIC shares increased from 2.69% to 
4.8%, an increase of 78%.195 At the end of 2014, foreign investment in 
open-end mutual funds represented 3.15% of the sum of direct foreign 
investments in open-end RICs, U.S. corporate equities, U.S. corporate 
bonds, U.S. Treasury securities, and Agency- and Government-Sponsored 
Enterprise (GSE)-backed securities. This represents an increase of 64% 
from the end of 2004.196 These data suggest that the foreign RIC provisions 
may have stimulated investment in RICs. 
According to data of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, as of 
June 30, 2014, all foreign investors held $1.039 trillion of shares of funds, 
including mutual funds.197 Treaty investors held $609 billion, or about 
60%. The Federal Reserve data, however, includes hedge funds, and it is 
consequently difficult to draw any definitive conclusions about the current 
ownership of RICs by investors from treaty countries.198 
Congress may have eschewed look-through if it were concerned with a 
RIC potentially foregoing treaty benefits to benefit foreign investors at the 
expense of U.S. investors. For example, assume that a RIC earns some 
interest from Country A that is taxed at 10% without any treaty benefits and 
some interest taxed at 0% with treaty benefits. If a RIC were composed 
primarily of foreign investors from countries with no U.S. treaty, it could be 
beneficial for the RIC to forgo the treaty rate reduction so that the foreign 
 
 194 See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FEDERAL RESERVE STATISTICAL 
RELEASE: Z.1 FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES, FLOW OF FUNDS, BALANCE 
SHEETS, AND INTEGRATED MACROECONOMIC ACCOUNTS, HISTORICAL ANNUAL TABLES 2005–
2014, 102 tbl.L.132 (2015). Note, this data does not include money market mutual funds, 
closed-end funds, or ETFs. Money market funds held by foreign investors totaled $113.4 
billion at the end of 2014, up from $23 billion in 2005. Id. 
 195 See id. 
 196 See id. 
 197 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., & BD. OF GOVERNORS 
OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FOREIGN PORTFOLIO HOLDING OF U.S. SECURITIES, 18–19 tbl.13, 
A-24 tbl.A4. The data includes open-end funds, closed-end funds, money market funds, and 
hedge funds. Id. at 18. 
 198 The country with the greatest value of fund assets, $164 billion (15.8% of the total), 
was the Cayman Islands, which is a well-known country for hedge-fund formation. Id. at 19 
tbl. 13. Another popular situs for hedge fund formation, the British Virgin Islands, invested 
$39 billion (3.8% of the total) and was number 8 on the list. Id. at A-24 tbl.A4. If a hedge 
fund is formed in the Cayman Islands and is taxed as a partnership, certain partners of the 
fund may be eligible for treaty benefits. See supra Part III.E. 
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investors could receive the interest free of U.S. tax as a QII dividend.199 If, 
however, the RIC elected treaty benefits, the interest would be taxed at 0% 
at the RIC level, but subject to a 30% U.S. withholding tax when 
distributed. 
Another reason Congress did not adopt look-through may have been to 
bolster the U.S. treaty policy of treating RICs as treaty residents,200 
regardless of any LOB provision. A withholding tax on distributions of 
foreign source income supports both the argument that a RIC is not a pure 
pass-through entity because the foreign source income is not treated as 
foreign source income when distributed and the argument that a RIC cannot 
be used to treaty shop. This position has been advanced by the OECD201 
and the ICI in submissions to foreign governments.202 
This concern is a slightly novel twist on traditional U.S. concerns with 
treaty shopping. U.S. tax authorities are generally concerned with foreign 
investors attempting to obtain treaty benefits with respect to U.S. source 
income by investing through an entity organized in a country with which 
the United States has an income tax treaty.203 The United States is 
 
 199 Under some bills introduced before the enactment of enactment of sections 871(k) 
and 881(e), the definition of QII included foreign source interest “other than interest that is 
subject to tax imposed by a foreign jurisdiction if the amount of such tax is reduced (or 
eliminated) by a treaty with the United States.” See, e.g., H.R. 1669, 108th Cong. § 2(a) 
(2003) (proposing new section 871(k)(1)(E)(ii)). Consequently, if the treaty interest 
provision were not invoked, the interest would have been subject to a tax, but since the tax 
would not have been reduced or eliminated by a treaty, it would have constituted QII. It is 
possible that the Service would not have agreed with this interpretation of the statute. For 
U.S. investors, the failure to elect treaty benefits could reduce the foreign tax credit, since 
the foreign taxes may be treated as a “noncompulsory amount” under Treas. Reg. § 1.901-
2(e)(5)(i) (as amended in 2013). 
Congress also may have eschewed look-through because it could have been difficult to 
show that a 0% rate on interest was pursuant to domestic law and not pursuant to a treaty, 
especially if a fund earned both tax-exempt portfolio interest and taxable interest. In such 
case, a fund could opt not to invoke the treaty to preserve the 0% rate on the portfolio 
interest. 
 200 See U.S. Technical Explanation, supra note 142,  at 13 (“[RICs and REITS] that are 
nominally subject to tax but that in practice are rarely required to pay tax also would 
generally be treated as residents and therefore accorded treaty benefits.”). 
 201 OECD, Treaty Benefits CIVs, supra note 126, para. 6.20 (a CIV whose distributions 
to foreign investors are subject to a withholding tax presents less danger of treaty shopping). 
 202 See Letter from Keith Lawson, Senior Counsel, Inv. Company Inst., to Byung-Cheol 
Kim, Dir. Corp. Tax Div., Korean Ministry of Strategy and Fin., supra note 146, app. at 3 
(describing the significant adverse tax effect of non-U.S. investments in RICs). 
 203 U.S. Model Technical Explanation, supra note 120, at 63 (“Article 22 contains anti-
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concerned that in the absence of impediments to treaty shopping, foreign 
countries that do not have a treaty with the United States will not have an 
incentive to enter into a treaty with the United States (and thus give up their 
source basis revenues and enhance residence basis taxation) if their 
residents can obtain treaty benefits with the United States by merely using 
the treaty of a third country. Thus, treaty shopping has generally been 
concerned with protecting U.S. tax on U.S. source income.204 In fact, with 
respect to foreign source income earned by U.S. persons, the United States 
generally benefits from U.S. investors lowering foreign taxes through tax 
planning, including treaty shopping, because a reduction in foreign taxes 
increases residence basis taxes.205 
The foreign RIC provisions have a decidedly different focus and effect. 
By subjecting the foreign source income of RICs to U.S. tax, the United 
States is not protecting U.S. taxes on U.S. source income but rather foreign 
tax on foreign source income. In addition, the benefits of such protection do 
not inure to the source country but rather to the United States. 
The OECD considered this issue at length and proposed various 
mechanisms to address treaty shopping.206 In general, the OECD provisions 
focus on limiting a portion of a CIV’s treaty benefits at the source country 
level based on the composition of a CIV’s owners. In essence, these 
proposals move towards treating a CIV, for treaty purposes, as a partnership 
rather than as a separate legal entity. 
One OECD proposal would limit a CIV’s treaty benefits in proportion 
to its ownership by equivalent beneficiaries.207 Another would limit a 
CIV’s treaty benefits in proportion to the percentage of the CIV’s owners 
that are residents of the CIV’s country of residence.208 Recognizing that 
both of these approaches would impose substantial administrative burdens 
 
treaty-shopping provisions that are intended to prevent residents of third countries from 
benefiting from what is intended to be a reciprocal agreement between two countries”). 
 204 See, e.g., Aiken, Indus., Inc. v. Comm’r, 56 T.C. 925 (1971); N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. 
v. Comm’r, 101 T.C. 294 (1993), aff’d, 115 F.3d 506 (1997). The conduit financing 
regulations, which permit an intermediate entity to be disregarded in certain financing 
transactions, generally apply to determine the U.S. tax liability of a U.S. corporation. See 
Treas. Reg. § 1.881-3 (as amended in 2012). 
 205 For purposes of the business purpose test of section 355, the reduction of foreign 
taxes is a valid business purpose. See Rev. Rul. 89-101, 1989-2 C.B. 67. 
 206 OECD, Treaty Benefits CIVs, supra note 126, paras. 52–57. The relevant revisions 
to the OECD Model Commentary addressing treaty shopping are found in OECD, Model 
Commentary, supra note 128, art. 1, paras. 6.19–6.32. 
 207 OECD, Model Commentary, supra note 128, art. 1, paras. 6.21–6.24. 
 208 Id. art. 1, para. 6.26. 
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on a CIV to determine precisely the tax residence of its shareholders, the 
OECD suggested that contracting states could consider adopting a provision 
that would grant treaty benefits in their entirety to a CIV if at least a certain 
percentage of the CIV’s shares were owned by equivalent beneficiaries or 
residents of the CIV’s country of residence.209 
Current U.S. tax treaty policy endeavors to treat all RICs as qualified 
persons, which ensures that their income, in its entirety, is eligible for treaty 
benefits.210 The OECD proposals, which limit treaty benefits in proportion 
to the identity of a CIV’s owners, may not currently be viable options for 
the United States for two reasons. First, the withholding tax on a RIC’s 
foreign source income paid to foreign investors ensures that RICs are not 
viable treaty shopping vehicles.211 Second, it is unclear how the OECD 
proposals, which would treat a CIV’s income as partially qualified for 
treaty benefits, would work in connection with the distribution of the CIV’s 
income. For instance, if a CIV earns $100 and 80% of the investors are 
equivalent beneficiaries (or U.S. residents) eligible for a 15% withholding 
tax, under the OECD proposal, the 15% rate will apply to $80 of the income 
paid to the CIV. When the CIV distributes all of its income, how are the 
treaty benefits supposed to be allocated between the equivalent 
beneficiaries (or residents) and nonequivalent beneficiaries (or 
nonresidents)? Under U.S. law, there is currently no mechanism to make 
such an allocation. Without a mechanism to allocate separately the treaty 
benefits to the equivalent beneficiaries, the OECD proposals fall short of 
“serv[ing] the goal of neutrality.”212 
Another weakness of the OECD approaches is that it is well nigh 
impossible to know the identity of owners of shares held through financial 
intermediaries. Furthermore, even if a CIV could determine that an owner 
was, for instance, a U.K. person (individual or legal entity), it would be 
quite burdensome to determine whether the person was actually a qualified 
resident for treaty purposes. Also, the identity of the CIV’s owners changes 
between the time the CIV receives the income and when the income is 
distributed. The OECD recognized that daily tracing would be impossible 
and impractical and suggested that contracting states accept practical 
approaches that would not require daily tracing.213 
 
 209 Id. art. 1, para. 6.27. 
 210 Nonpublicly traded RICs are treated as qualified residents in a sotto voce manner. 
See discussion supra Part IV.B. 
 211 OECD, Model Commentary, supra note 128, art. 1, para. 6.20. 
 212 Id. art. 1, para. 6.23. 
 213 Id. art. 1, para. 6.29. 
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At least one U.S. treaty has adopted a look-through approach in 
determining whether a CIV is entitled to treaty benefits. The 2006 protocol 
to the U.S.-Germany treaty amended the LOB article to provide that a 
German Investment Fund would be granted treaty benefits only if at least 
90% of the shares were owned by German residents or equivalent 
beneficiaries.214 The reason apparently is that such funds exempt the 
foreign source income from German tax when distributed to foreign 
investors.215 The technical explanation to the protocol states that the 
competent authorities in determining indirect ownership may use 
statistically valid sampling techniques.216 
Recognizing the important role that financial intermediaries play in the 
custodianship of financial assets and the challenges of applying treaty 
benefits to income earned on assets nominally held by such intermediaries, 
the OECD put forth an implementation package in 2013 to allow 
intermediaries to claim treaty benefits on a “pooled basis” on behalf of 
customers.217 The proposals aim to eliminate the need for individual 
investors to apply for reduced source basis withholding by allowing the 
intermediary to do so on their behalf without requiring the intermediary to 
disclose the identity of its beneficial owners.218 
 
 214 Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal 
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital Gains to Certain Other Taxes, U.S.-
F.R.G., Aug. 29, 1989, S. Treaty Doc. 101-10, amended by Protocol Amending the 
Convention Between the United States of America and The Federal Republic of Germany 
for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to 
Taxes on Income and Capital Gains to Certain Other Taxes, Signed on 29th August 1989, 
U.S.-Ger., art. XIV, art. 28, para. 6,  June 1, 2006, S. Treaty Doc. 109-20 [hereinafter “U.S.-
German Treaty”]. 
 215 BROWN, supra note 128, at 41. 
 216 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE PROTOCOL SIGNED 
AT BERLIN ON JUNE 1, 2006 AMENDING THE CONVENTION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY FOR THE AVOIDANCE OF DOUBLE 
TAXATION AND THE PREVENTION OF FISCAL EVASION WITH RESPECT TO TAXES ON INCOME 
AND CAPITAL GAINS TO CERTAIN OTHER TAXES art. XIV [hereinafter U.S.-Germany 
Technical Explanation]. 
 217 Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. [OECD], Trace Implementation Package for 
the Adoption of the Authorised Intermediary System (Jan. 23, 2013), 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/TRACE_Implementation_Package_ 
Website.pdf. The implementation package follows recommendations from OECD, POSSIBLE 
IMPROVEMENTS, supra note 127, at 33–37 and OECD, TREATY BENEFITS CIVS, supra note 
126, at paras. 38–40. 
 218 Id. The Trace Implementation Package provides a series of model agreements that 
would be entered into by the financial intermediary and source country, and model 
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To date, no U.S. intermediary has entered into an authorized 
intermediary agreement.219 If a RIC is treated as a qualified person for 
treaty benefits, these agreements would probably not be necessary since the 
RIC would be entitled to treaty benefits. But if a source country views a 
RIC as a pass-through and extends treaty benefits only to the extent that the 
RIC’s owners are U.S. residents or equivalent beneficiaries, such an 
agreement may be necessary to permit a RIC to obtain treaty benefits on 
behalf of its investors. 
F.  Summary 
 The current U.S. tax regime penalizes foreign investors in U.S. RICs 
to the extent a RIC earns foreign source income, as a foreign investor is 
almost always worse off by earning foreign source income indirectly 
through a RIC rather than earning it directly (or through a partnership).220 
Treaty shopping may be an illusory concern if one makes reasonable 
assumptions about the residence basis taxes paid by foreign investors. The 
final section discusses how the foreign RIC provisions could be modified to 
better reflect their pass-through nature but without RICs becoming vehicles 
that foster treaty shopping.   
V.  OPTIONS FOR FOREIGN MUTUAL FUND INVESTORS 
This last part explores various options for foreign mutual fund 
investors under current law and considers how Congress could modify 
current law to reflect better the pass-through nature of RICs but still 
mitigate treaty-shopping concerns. Given the large number of shareholders 
of a typical RIC, certain options may not currently be administratively 
viable. 
 
agreements on CIVs under existing treaties. See, e.g., id. at 19; id. at 113. This reflects the 
different approaches to treaty shopping discussed in OECD, Treaty Benefits CIVs, supra 
note 126, paras. 6.21–6.24, 6.26. 
 219 The OECD has stated that “implementation of the recommendations of the TRACE 
project was important for the practical application of [the conclusions in the CIVs Benefits 
Report].” Revised Discussion Draft, BEPS Action 6: Prevent Treaty Abuse, supra note 132, 
at 8. 
 220 The only scenario in which a foreign investor is not penalized is when the foreign 
source income is tax-exempt in the hands of the RIC and the foreign investor can avail 
himself or herself of the benefits of a treaty with the United States so that the income is 
taxed at 15%; but if the investor had earned the income directly from the foreign country, it 
would have been taxed at 30%. 
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A.  Living with the Current RIC Regime 
Under the current foreign mutual fund regime, foreign investors are 
afforded look-through treatment for U.S. source interest and capital gains, 
but not for foreign source income, which is subject to U.S. tax when 
distributed. The obvious strategy is for foreign investors to avoid RICs with 
foreign source income. This is not necessarily an easy task. While some 
funds clearly have a mandate to invest in U.S. assets, e.g., a fund that holds 
only U.S. treasuries, or foreign assets, e.g., an Asia or emerging markets 
fund, others may invest in both U.S. and foreign assets, the respective 
percentages of which can vary over time. Although mutual funds must 
disclose their holdings quarterly, it is not always obvious whether a 
particular issuer is foreign or domestic.221 Given the importance of this 
issue for foreign investors, consideration could be given to require funds to 
disclose periodically the percentage of foreign assets they hold or foreign 
income they earn.222 
Another more complicated self-help option is to trade around a fund’s 
dividend distributions. A RIC that invests primarily in equities generally 
pays dividends quarterly or yearly. The directors of the fund establish a 
record date, which is the date on which an investor must be a shareholder 
in order to receive a dividend. On the ex-dividend date, the fund’s NAV is 
reduced by the distribution. This date is generally the date following the 
record date. The shareholder of record receives the dividend on the payment 
date, which is the generally the ex-dividend date.223 
The goal of this strategy is to avoid being a shareholder on the record 
date. By selling before the record date, a shareholder in essence turns 
dividend income into capital gain (loss).224  For an open-end fund, a simple 
strategy is to request redemption on the day before the record date and then 
to reinvest on the record date. Since redemptions and contributions are 
generally done at the fund’s NAV at day end, an investor following such a 
 
 221 The fund prospectus may disclose whether the fund may invest in foreign securities. 
 222 For the funds that disclose the amounts of QII and IRD, one can roughly determine 
the percentage of foreign assets by examining the historical percentage of dividends that 
constituted QII and IRD. In addition, in a fund’s financial disclosures, an investor can 
observe the quantity of swap and securities lending income. 
 223 For publicly traded companies, there is generally a time lag between the record date 
and payment date. 
 224 The exact amount depends on the appreciation or depreciation in the RIC shares, 
which depends on the economic gains or losses of the fund since the shareholder purchased 
his shares. 
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strategy would not be a shareholder on the record date.225 
One downside to this strategy is the loss of any gains accruing on the 
record date. This tradeoff may be acceptable if the distribution (and 
corresponding tax avoided) is large and infrequent, say quarterly or 
annually.226 The efficiency of this strategy is diminished if the fund 
imposes a redemption fee for short-term trading. Redemption fees typically 
range from 0.75% to 2.00% with look-back periods of between seven and 
ninety days.227 Given an ordinary dividend distribution of 1.5%, a 1.5% 
redemption fee is equivalent to a 100% tax and eliminates any benefit to 
trading around the dividend distribution. 
To avoid a redemption fee, a shareholder could remain on the sidelines 
and forego any expected returns over the fee period. An alternative is to 
trade out of the particular fund immediately before the record date and 
invest the proceeds immediately in a similar fund.228 Since most equity 
funds are well diversified and have similar risk profiles, the returns of the 
new fund would probably track closely the returns of the sold fund.229 To 
the extent a fund pays more frequent dividends, this strategy becomes more 
administratively burdensome and the loss of expected returns greater 
(although the potential tax savings may be greater). This strategy is riskier 
in the case of ETFs, as it requires selling and purchasing ETF shares on an 
exchange. These purchases generate trading costs, such as brokerage fees 
and selling at the “bid” price and purchasing at the “ask” price. These costs 
may not be insignificant. 
 
 225 The board resolution authorizing payment of dividend generally authorizes payment 
of dividends to shareholders of record at the opening of business on record date. Thus, a 
shareholder who purchases shares on a particular day becomes a shareholder as of the end of 
close of business and is therefore not a shareholder of record on that day for purposes of 
dividends. 
 226 Assume that a fund has an expected annual return of 7% or an expected daily return 
of 2.69 basis points, which is derived by solving the following equation: [((1+r)^252)-
1=.07], where 252 corresponds to the number of days during the year a shareholder can 
redeem from an open-end fund. On an investment of $100,000, this corresponds to an 
expected daily return of $26.90. For this strategy to be viable, the taxes avoided must be 
greater than this amount. 
 227 For a list of funds and redemption fees see ALERUS, Funds Charging Fees (May 12, 
2014), www2.alerusfinancial.com/arsws/feegrid.pdf. 
 228 If the investor wanted to invest in the original fund, it could withdraw from the new 
fund and reinvest in the original fund once the redemption fee period expired. 
 229 The traditional measures of a fund’s risk are Beta and R2, which is a measure of how 
much of a fund’s return is attributable to exposure to a particular index. These are available 
from commercial vendors of mutual fund information, such as Morningstar. 
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Even if these strategies enhance a foreign investor’s after-tax returns, 
they are burdensome and should not be encouraged. Buying and selling 
over the record date requires constant monitoring of dividend declarations 
by boards and may generate trading costs that will diminish if not eliminate 
any tax savings. It certainly is not economically viable for smaller 
shareholders. The buying and selling of shares of open-end mutual funds 
impose unnecessary tax and administrative costs on other shareholders, as 
the fund may have to liquidate part of its holdings to satisfy redemption 
requests, generating fund income that is taxed to all shareholders.230 
B.  Full Pass-Through for Untaxed Foreign Source Income 
Although various bills would have exempted from U.S. tax any 
untaxed foreign source interest received by a RIC, Congress ultimately 
rejected including this proposal as part of the final foreign RIC provisions. 
For fixed income RICs, this would substantially mitigate the double 
taxation of foreign source interest income. It also prevents treaty shopping, 
since it applies look-through treatment only to income that does not benefit 
from a U.S. treaty. 
As shown in Table 3 above, under this proposal there would have been 
an additional layer of U.S. tax on a RIC’s foreign source dividends and 
swap income, regardless whether the income was actually subject to source 
basis taxation, and on any interest subject to source basis taxation. Thus, for 
RICs that invest in foreign equities the combination of source basis taxation 
and the additional U.S. tax on foreign source dividends would still make 
RICs relatively tax inefficient vehicles for foreign investors. If such a 
proposal were again considered, look-through treatment should be extended 
for other income that is exempt from source basis taxation, such as swap 
income or even dividends that were not subject to source basis taxation.231 
C.  Full Pass-Through for All Income 
In a world in which there were no treaties and source investment 
income were taxed at the same rates, adopting a complete pass-through 
regime for a RIC’s foreign source income would significantly reduce 
 
 230 This occurs if redemption requests are greater than contributions. If contributions 
are greater than redemption requests, a fund can satisfy the redemption requests with the 
contribution proceeds. 
 231 The United Kingdom, for example, does not impose withholding taxes on dividends 
paid to foreign residents. 
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double taxation of investment income and move towards tax neutrality of 
investing through a RIC and investing directly.232 When a treaty applies, 
however, a treaty resident gets the benefits of the treaty provisions, e.g., 
lower source basis taxation. Since a RIC is a treaty resident, treaty benefits 
inure not to the RIC but to the RIC shareholders who benefit from the 
reduced source basis taxes. If a RIC shareholder is a foreigner, the 
shareholder gets the benefits of a U.S. treaty whether or not the foreigner is 
a resident of a country with a treaty with the source country. This scenario 
raises the specter of treaty shopping and appears to be the primary reason 
Congress did not adopt full pass-through for foreign source income. 
Similarly, a foreign RIC shareholder could pay source taxes by investing 
through a RIC if the United States did not have a treaty with the source 
country but the shareholder’s country of residence did. 
Given that treaty benefits apply (or do not apply) at the RIC level and 
not the shareholder level, currently the only somewhat crude mechanism to 
prevent treaty shopping by foreign shareholders is for the U.S. to impose 
tax on a RIC’s foreign source income when it is distributed. 
Although treaty shopping is theoretically possible, the concern with 
treaty shopping is probably overblown. First, most interest on publicly 
traded portfolio debt is exempt from source basis taxation in the United 
States and Europe.233 Swap income is also generally exempt from source 
basis taxation. Consequently, a RIC’s foreign investors do not need the 
benefit of a treaty to obtain a 0% rate on portfolio interest or swap income. 
For these types of income that are exempt from source basis taxation, there 
is no risk of RICs being used to treaty shop by third-country investors. 
Second, if one assumes that most foreign investors in a RIC can avail 
themselves of a treaty with the source country if they invest directly,234 
given the similarity of treaty rates on dividends, interest, and swap income 
(15%, 0%, and 0% respectively), the possibility of treaty shopping may be 
remote: a treaty foreign investor is taxed at the same rate on such income 
whether he or she invests directly or indirectly through a RIC. 
 
 232 A foreign investor could be slightly better off investing through a RIC with respect 
to U.S. source income because investment expenses are deductible in computing ICTI but 
are not deductible against FDAP income. See supra Part II.B. This is still the case under 
current law. 
 233 See supra Part III.A. 
 234 For 2011, roughly 90% of U.S. source dividends were paid to residents of a country 
with which the United States had an income tax treaty. See Luttrell, supra note 53, at tbl.2. 
This data may overstate the percentage of dividends received by treaty residents if the 
recipient is not a qualified person under a particular treaty. 
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Furthermore, as shown above, for a foreign investor who is subject to 
residence basis taxation and can credit direct foreign taxes against residence 
basis taxation, there are virtually no circumstances in which a foreign 
investor is better off by investing through a RIC than investing directly. 
Finally, treaty shopping generally occurs in highly structured 
transactions. A RIC’s foreign shareholders typically have little ability to 
control the RIC’s investment decisions and direct the RIC to make 
investments that are designed to enhance the after-tax returns for any 
particular group of foreign investors.235 The RIC diversification 
requirement generally ensures that RICs hold a relatively diversified 
portfolio. Consequently, no one issuer or group of issuers will likely 
constitute a significant percentage of a RIC’s portfolio, and it is therefore 
unlikely a foreign investor will significantly benefit from any potential 
treaty shopping. 
One potential consequence of adopting a full pass-through regime for 
all of a RIC’s income is that U.S. treaty partners may argue that RICs 
should be treated as pass-through entities for treaty purposes, which would 
require each RIC shareholder to demonstrate that it was entitled to treaty 
benefits. Alternatively, U.S. treaty partners could argue that a RIC’s 
entitlement to treaty benefits should be limited based on the percentage of 
foreign shareholders.236 It is possible, however, to implement a full pass-
through regime for RIC income if it were limited to treaty investors. 
D.  Full Pass-Through for Income of Treaty Investors 
To both address concerns with treaty shopping by foreign investors and 
ensure that investing through RICs remains tax-neutral, Congress could 
consider modifying the current regime to permit full pass-through of 
foreign source income (including income that would be foreign source if 
directly received by a foreign investor) solely for investors that are eligible 
for U.S. treaty benefits. Two assumptions underlie this proposal. First, an 
 
 235 It is possible that a fund family could establish a fund designed to provide benefits 
for investors from a particular country (or countries). The circumstances in which this makes 
sense are probably relatively limited. The OECD notes that justification for treating publicly 
traded entities as being qualified residents is based on the fact that the owners cannot 
individually exercise control over the entity. See U.S.-Germany Technical Explanation, 
supra note 216, at art. XIV ¶ 6., see OECD, TREATY BENEFITS CIVS, supra note 126 at para. 
57 and OECD, MODEL COMMENTARY, supra note 128, art. 1, para. 6.32. 
 236 For a discussion of the OECD proposals to limit treaty shopping based on the 
identity of a CIV’s owners, see supra Part IV.D. 
546 Virginia Tax Review [Vol.  35:483 
 
investor resident in a treaty country is probably not investing through a RIC 
to garner untoward treaty benefits, since it is likely that the investor’s 
country of residence has a similar treaty with the source country. Second, 
since the United States has terminated its treaties with pure tax havens, the 
countries with which the United States has treaties generally tax their 
residents’ worldwide income.237 Thus, the RIC’s distributions will be taxed 
on a residence basis. 
Full pass-through of a RIC’s foreign source income for treaty investors 
could be implemented in various ways. The simplest approach would be to 
provide pass-through treatment for all foreign source income (and income 
that would be treated as foreign source if directly received by a foreign 
investor) for investors resident in a country with a U.S. treaty. Foreign 
investors in a RIC would only pay tax generally on the portion of a RIC’s 
dividend that was attributable to U.S. source dividends.238 
Precedent for such an approach can be found in treaties that extend 
U.S. benefits to entities that are formed in a treaty country but owned by 
residents of a third country who qualify as equivalent beneficiaries. 
Because of the third-country ownership, such entities may not otherwise be 
qualified persons under an LOB article.239 
An equivalent beneficiary is generally a resident of a EU country or 
NAFTA signatory that is entitled to the benefits of an income tax treaty 
between the beneficiary’s country of residence and the source country.240 In 
addition, for interest and dividends, the rate under the equivalent 
beneficiary’s treaty and the source country must be as least as low as the 
rate under the treaty between the United States and the source country.241 
For example, if the treaty of the entity receiving a U.S. source dividend has 
rates of 0%, 5%, and 15%, but the treaty of the equivalent beneficiary with 
the United States has only dividend rates of 5% and 15%, the equivalent 
beneficiary is only entitled to the 5% or 15% rate.242 
 
 237 For entities that are tax-exempt in the residence, such as charities and pensions, the 
evolving treaty policy is that these entities should also be exempt from source basis taxes. 
Consequently, for these entities, treaty shopping should not be a concern. 
 238 There could be other relatively minor categories of U.S. source income that would 
be taxable. 
 239 See, e.g. U.S.-U.K. Treaty, supra note 118, art. 23, para. 3(a). 
 240 See, e.g. U.S.-U.K. Treaty, supra note 118, art. 23, para. 7(d)(i)(A), as amended by 
the Protocol, art. IV (defining equivalent beneficiary). 
 241 Id. art. 23, para. 7(d)(i)(B), as amended by the Protocol, art. IV. 
 242 See, e.g., U.S.-U.K. Technical Explanation, supra note 142 (explaining art. 23, para. 
3). 
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The equivalent beneficiary provision is a type of derivative benefits 
test that extends treaty benefits if the indirect recipient would have been 
entitled to treaty benefits had he or she received the income from the source 
country directly. The policy rationale behind an equivalent beneficiary 
provision is that an entity formed in a treaty country that is owned by 
equivalent beneficiaries was neither formed nor availed of to treaty shop, 
because had the equivalent beneficiaries used an entity formed in their 
countries or directly earned the income from the United States, they would 
have been entitled to equivalent treaty benefits. In essence, the equivalent 
beneficiary provision creates a multilateral treaty network based on bilateral 
treaty relationships. 
There are some important differences, however, between this proposal 
and the operation of the derivative benefits provisions of current tax 
treaties. Derivative benefits provisions generally apply only to entities that 
are owned by seven or fewer equivalent beneficiaries. By limiting 
derivative benefits to seven or fewer persons, the provision is much easier 
to administer. In the case of a RIC, however, there may be tens or hundreds 
of thousands of potential equivalent beneficiaries. The derivative benefits 
provision generally applies to income arising in the source country and paid 
to an entity owned by equivalent beneficiaries residing in up to seven 
countries. In contrast, a RIC’s dividend income may arise from companies 
that are residents of numerous countries and is paid to shareholders who are 
residents of numerous countries. 
Under the simple version of the full pass-through proposal, the foreign 
investor would merely have to be resident of a country that had a treaty 
with the United States; the foreign investor would not have to demonstrate 
that it would have been eligible for treaty benefits with the source country. 
Thus, it is possible that some RIC investors may not be true equivalent 
beneficiaries in that they would not be entitled to treaty benefits with the 
source country had they invested directly, or they may not be entitled to a 
rate as low as the U.S. source country rate. 
Although this is a reasonable objection, it does not appear to present 
the potential for inappropriate results in most cases. First, the treaty rates 
applicable to portfolio dividends, interest, and swap income are generally 
uniform across treaties, since most treaties follow the OECD Model Treaty. 
Thus, it is unlikely that a foreign investor would get more beneficial rates 
under the U.S. treaty than under a treaty with the source country. In 
addition, because the United States has entered into fewer treaties than 
many of the countries that supply capital to the United States, it is more 
likely that a RIC foreign investor would be a resident of a country that has a 
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treaty with the source country than with the United States. Furthermore, 
under this proposal, look-through would only apply if the foreign investor 
had a treaty with the United States and not with the source country. Some 
foreign investors would therefore be denied treaty benefits even though had 
they invested in the source country, they would have been entitled to treaty 
benefits. 
An alternative approach that is consistent with the derivative benefits 
provisions in current treaties but more complicated and administratively 
burdensome would extend full look-through only to a treaty resident who is 
an actual equivalent beneficiary, but extend the term to include any person 
who would be eligible for source country treaty benefits. To implement 
such an approach, the RIC would first have to apportion among separate 
countries the foreign taxes it has paid and assign them to the appropriate 
income categories, e.g., dividends or interest. For interest and dividends, 
this is certainly manageable at the RIC level. When a RIC makes a 
distribution to a foreign shareholder, the shareholder would have to 
demonstrate that he or she was entitled to the benefits of a source country 
treaty, i.e., that he or she was eligible for equivalent benefits for each 
country’s taxes. For an equity RIC that earned dividends from fifteen or 
twenty European countries, this would require a foreign shareholder to 
demonstrate that he or she was eligible for derivative benefits for those 
fifteen or twenty countries. Who would be responsible to confirm his 
eligibility for derivative benefits, the RIC? A RIC could be required to 
withhold at 30% when it distributes a dividend, and the foreign shareholder 
could be required to demonstrate to the Service that it was entitled to 
derivative benefits to receive a refund of U.S. withholding taxes.243 This 
approach would impose costs on foreign shareholders, which could be quite 
significant, especially for smaller shareholders. It is not entirely clear how 
the Service could determine whether a foreign shareholder was actually 
entitled to derivative benefits.244 
Since both of these approaches are applied at the RIC shareholder 
level, they differ from those considered by the OECD, which generally 
 
 243 This is generally how the U.S. collects tax from foreign sellers of U.S. real property 
interests. See I.R.C. § 1445. 
 244 Foreign countries often withhold tax on payments to a U.S. person at regular rates 
and require the recipient to demonstrate that it was a treaty resident. The U.S. person must 
request the Service to certify treaty residence on Form 6166, which is requested by filing 
Form 8802. If such an approach were adopted for foreign shareholders, each shareholder 
would probably have to supply a similar treaty certification for each country. There is 
currently a filing fee of $85 for U.S. taxpayers. 
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would allow a CIV treaty benefit to the extent that it is owned by equivalent 
beneficiaries or residents of the CIV’s country of residence.245 The OECD 
approaches would harm a RIC’s shareholders who are not equivalent 
beneficiaries or residents of the CIV’s country of residence because there is 
no mechanism under Subchapter M to apply treaty benefits solely to such 
shareholders when a RIC distributes its income.246 
It is not currently administratively feasible to require a foreign investor 
to demonstrate that he or she is entitled to derivative benefits with respect 
to foreign source income of a RIC, but it is easy and feasible to require a 
foreign shareholder to show that he or she is entitled to U.S. treaty benefits. 
Although this approach may extend look-through for shareholders who are 
not true equivalent beneficiaries, it implements pass-through taxation while 
protecting against treaty shopping. This proposal, coupled with the lack of 
any credit for source basis taxes paid by a RIC, virtually ensures that 
foreign investors would not invest through a RIC to treaty shop. 
E.  Pass-Through of Foreign Taxes 
Even if Congress were to exempt from U.S. tax a RIC’s foreign source 
income for treaty investors, such investors may still be economically worse 
off by investing through a RIC than investing directly if the RIC’s foreign 
source income is subject to source taxation. A RIC only distributes to a 
foreign shareholder its after-foreign-tax income.247 Assuming the investor’s 
country of residence does not permit a credit for source basis taxes levied 
on the RIC’s income, a foreign investor gets only the benefit of a deduction 
for source basis taxes paid by the RIC. 
To illustrate, if a RIC earns $100 of foreign source dividend income on 
which $15 of taxes are withheld by the source country, the RIC will 
distribute only $85 to the foreign investor. Provided that there is no 
additional U.S. withholding tax, the foreign investor would be subject to 
residence basis tax on the $85 but would not receive a credit for the $15 
source basis tax. Since the investor would only be taxed on $85, he or she 
 
 245 See supra Part IV.E. 
 246 Taxable shareholders of a RIC that makes a section 853 election may be indifferent 
because they will merely have a larger foreign tax credit. Tax-exempt shareholders, such as 
pensions or 401(k) accounts, will be harmed because the RIC’s NAV will be reduced by the 
higher source country withholding taxes, which tax-exempt shareholders cannot use. 
 247 Under current law, foreign shareholders of a RIC that makes the foreign tax credit 
election under section 853 may also be subject to U.S. tax on the foreign taxes paid by the 
RIC. See infra Part III.B. 
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receives in essence the benefit of a deduction for the source taxes, and there 
is double taxation of the RIC’s income. 
Under current law, when the RIC distributes $85, an additional 15% 
(or 30%) U.S. withholding tax is levied, and the $85 is subject to residence 
basis tax.248 Since the withholding tax is a direct tax, the foreign investor 
should be able to credit it against his or her residence tax liability. Thus, 
there is no double taxation of the $85 distributed, but again, the investor is 
only receiving a deduction and not a credit for the source basis taxes paid 
by the RIC. 
Allowing a credit for source basis taxes may also be a possible 
mechanism to mitigate the double taxation of foreign source income earned 
through RICs. If the foreign investor were to receive a credit for source 
basis tax and any U.S. tax, double taxation would be mitigated, and the 
foreign investor would be in the same economic position as if the investor 
had directly earned the income.249 Using the same numbers in the above 
examples, the foreign investor would have $100 of income and a potential 
credit of $15 if the United States did not tax the RIC dividend and $27.75 if 
the United States taxed the $85 RIC dividend at 30%.250 
A residence country could unilaterally implement such a rule, but it is 
not clear whether a residence country would permit its residents to credit 
the foreign taxes paid by a corporation of which they are shareholders.251 
The United States permits its residents to credit foreign taxes paid by RICs, 
but generally does not permit taxes paid by a corporate entity to be credited 
by individual shareholders.252 In contrast, foreign taxes paid by lower-tier 
partnerships are passed through to a U.S. partner when the partner includes 
in income the distributive share of the lower-tier partnership’s income. 
 
 248 Since withholding taxes are direct taxes, it is assumed that a foreign investor is 
subject to residence basis taxation on the pre-tax amount of the dividend. If there were no 
residence basis taxes, the residence country would presumably not permit a credit for any 
foreign taxes. 
 249 Double tax would be mitigated but not eliminated unless the residence country gave 
an unlimited credit for the total foreign taxes. Under U.S. law, for instance, a U.S. taxpayer 
can only credit foreign taxes levied at a rate equal to or less than the U.S. rate on the foreign 
source income. See I.R.C. § 904. The foreign investor is also not exactly in the same position 
had he or she invested directly because of the additional layer of U.S. tax. 
 250 The $72.25 is grossed up by $12.75 U.S. tax and $15 foreign tax paid by the RIC. 
 251 There would have to be some mechanism for the RIC to provide the information to 
foreign shareholders. 
 252 Certain corporate shareholders are permitted to credit taxes paid by other 
corporations when the corporate shareholder receives a dividend. See I.R.C. § 902 (indirect 
tax credit). 
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The OECD addressed this issue and suggested that it could be solved 
by including in the treaty between the CIV’s country of residence and the 
investor’s country of residence a provision that would require the investor’s 
country of residence to grant a credit for the source taxes imposed on the 
CIV’s income.253 After noting various possible objections — the measure 
would be an incomplete bilateral solution for a multilateral problem; 
reciprocal benefits may not be provided by the source country; the 
residence country could be required to grant relief greater than if an 
investor had directly invested — the OECD indicated that investors had not 
expressed an interest in making such claims.254 This could change if OECD 
proposals in the OECD become widely implemented. Resolving this issue 
will probably require a multilateral approach. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The foreign RIC provisions mitigate tax inefficiencies to foreign 
shareholders for a RIC’s U.S. source income, but the failure to adopt look-
through for foreign source income means that many RICs continue to be 
tax-inefficient investment vehicles for foreign investors. The current regime 
is thus inconsistent with the pass-through nature of RIC taxation, 
unnecessarily penalizes foreign investors in global RICs, and deprives the 
United States of tax revenue from RIC-related income, such as trading and 
management fees. Although treaty shopping may have been the primary 
rationale for not adopting pass-through for foreign source income, those 
concerns are largely illusory: a foreign investor potentially only benefits 
from a treaty between the United States and the source country if there is no 
residence taxation or the residence country does not credit U.S. taxes. By 
limiting look-through to treaty residents, a clearly second-best option, treaty 
shopping concerns should be entirely ameliorated and foreign investment in 
U.S. RICs facilitated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 253 OECD, Treaty Benefits CIVs, supra note 126 at paras. 41–47. 
 254 Id. at paras. 46 and 47. For a discussion see Gijs Fibbe, The 2010 Update of the 
OECD Commentary on Collective Investment Vehicles, in THE TAX TREATMENT OF CIVS 
AND REITS 67–71 (Hein Vermeulen ed., 2013). 
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